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Impeachment and Presidential Immunity
from Judicial Process
Joseph Isenbergh*
President Clinton was the first President to be impeached since
Andrew Johnson in 1868. The impeachment emerged—nearly out
of the blue—from judicial proceedings in which President Clinton
was a party. Two constitutional questions running through these
events—the scope of impeachment and the exposure of a sitting
President to compulsory judicial process—had received extensive
scrutiny during the Watergate affair. From that misadventure, which
led to President Nixon’s resignation in 1974, survived a body of
conventional academic wisdom and specific legal precedent on both
questions. On impeachment the academic consensus at the onset of
the recent proceedings was that impeachable offenses are defined in
the Constitution as “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and
misdemeanors,” the latter terms describing an imprecisely bounded
category of serious offenses. The President’s exposure to compulsory
judicial process, for its part, had been established definitively in
United States v. Nixon.1
The Monica Lewinsky affair, therefore, played out under
ground rules shaped in the previous episode involving misconduct by
a President. In my view, essential constitutional elements at issue in
these events were misconceived by the participants and most
academic commentators. The prevailing view of impeachment and
presidential immunity slights both the terms of the Constitution and
history. The scope of impeachment, based on a straightforward,
indeed unequivocal, reading of the constitutional provisions
concerning it, is demonstrably different from the academic
consensus. And, when impeachment is correctly understood, the
question of the President’s immunity from judicial process takes on a
different light. It is not a new light, however. Everything that I
*
1

Seymour Logan Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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expound here about impeachment and presidential immunity is
derived from the text of the Constitution and history
contemporaneous with its drafting. I propose, in other words, to
exhume the original meaning of the Constitution on these questions.
Although my immediate purpose is to establish the meaning of
several constitutional provisions from their language and history, the
constitutional scheme of impeachment and presidential immunity
that emerges from this exercise is also far preferable to the grotesque
muddle through which we suffered of late. Judged either by fidelity
to the original understanding embodied in the text of the
Constitution or just good sense, the view of impeachment and
presidential immunity that I propose here is better than what
prevails today.
The impeachment of President Clinton was dismissed by a
good number in the academic mainstream as beyond the pale of
legitimacy.2 Some of this reflected—transparently on occasion—a
prevalence of ideological sympathy with the President in academic
circles. It was also widely held, even among constitutional and
ideological
agnostics,
that
the
machinery
of
impeachment—culminating in possible removal from office—was
disproportionate to the President’s misconduct.
What has receded from view is that the Lewinsky affair, before
slouching through Congress, got its start in the courts. President
Clinton gave a deposition in a civil lawsuit orchestrated by political
opponents, having failed to win deferral of that suit on grounds of
presidential immunity.3 The lawsuit was later dismissed as meritless.
In the course of his deposition the President denied a sexual
relationship in a setting quite apart from the lawsuit. True or false,
the President’s denial is unremarkable. This is an area where civilized
2

See, e.g., New York Times, January 23, 1999 (reporting comments of Professor
Ackerman: “‘The issue is, Can agents of the House usurp the power of the House
to impeach a President and define “high crimes and misdemeanors”?’ Professor
Ackerman said.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Impeaching the President, 147 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 279 (1998). I chose these examples without afterthought because they are in
print and close at hand. A LEXIS search of comments and op-ed pieces by
constitutional law professors will overwhelmingly confirm this observation.
3
See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
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and otherwise honorable people are not always truthful.4 Later, in
testimony before a federal grand jury, the President reasserted
elements of his deposition statement. The rest I am sure the reader
knows. But if not, it is enough to say here that this sorry business,
from its beginnings in the courts as a marginal lawsuit, gained
momentum enough to carry it to an impeachment trial in the Senate.
Although Americans, and especially legal academic folk, take
for granted an imperial judiciary, in most of the world the role of the
courts in this affair was unfathomable, even shocking. The exposure
of a sitting chief of state to lawsuits, and to compulsory judicial
process generally, is unusual outside the United States. In discussions
with their European counterparts American lawyers sometimes tried
to put a good face on this affair, despite appearances, as
demonstrating that in a democracy no one, including the chief of
state, is above the law.5 A good number of those holding out this
pablum, I suspect, knew in their hearts that it is nonsense—that the
judicial proceedings involving President Clinton were beyond
reason. It was grotesque to have a sitting President tangled up in the
courts over what was at worst, or best, an histoire de couchage.
The stage was set for these events—and the irony is
palpable—in a Supreme Court decision of the Watergate era, United
States v. Nixon,6 holding that a sitting President is subject to
compulsory judicial process. United States v. Nixon was widely
admired in its day—1974—as a pathbreaking decision. The question
there had not before been directly resolved by a U.S. court.7 The
4

Divorce proceedings are a common setting for questions about sexual conduct.
Those involved are rarely at pains to tell all.
5
In 1998 I overheard a number of such conversations at various conferences in
Europe, and even on airplanes to and from such.
6
418 U.S. 683 (1974).
7
The inference has been drawn—erroneously I believe—from the proceedings
involving the Burr conspiracy of 1807 that the President is subject to compulsory
judicial process. The events in that case establish no such thing. Justice Marshall
issued a request to produce a letter held by President Jefferson. Jefferson, who had
already turned the letter over to the Attorney General, asked District Attorney
George Hay “voluntarily” to make it available in the proceedings. See David
Currie, The President’s Evidence [publication pending in ____].
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detractors of United States v. Nixon—and they were few—thought
that in the constitutional scheme the President is not subject to a
direct judicial command. Impeachment, some argued, was the only
way another part of the government could act against a President in
office. To this the proponents of United States v. Nixon, who were
overwhelmingly more numerous, answered that impeachment would
often be both insufficient and inapposite. Insufficient, because much
misconduct and legal obligation were beyond the reach of
impeachment. Inapposite, because impeachment can degenerate into
a political circus. Filtered through the courts, by contrast, a case
involving the President will receive impartial scrutiny.
These views are wrong in basic respects. To back up this
contention, I propose to analyze the constitutional provisions on
impeachment and their bearing on presidential immunity. In the
process, I shall attempt to get as close as possible to the original
meaning of the Constitution on these questions and to demonstrate
that this understanding of the Constitution frames a sounder regime
for dealing with misconduct by a President.
Presidential Immunity
At the outset, there is no smoking gun in the Constitution on
the question of presidential immunity—that is, no provision
explicitly shielding the President from compulsory judicial process,
or the contrary. The closer we get to the original understanding of
the Constitution, however, the more likely it seems that a sitting
The Burr proceedings literally establish only the willingness of the courts to
direct a request for evidence to the President. Even then Justice Marshall was at
pains to concede that “[i]n no case of this kind would a court be required to
proceed against the president as against an ordinary individual. The objections to
such a course are so strong and so obvious, that all must acknowledge them.”
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 192 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807). Currie
infers from the proceedings a concession by Justice Marshall of an important
measure of presidential immunity. In any event, the Burr proceedings went no
further than the issuance of a request by a court. The real test of presidential
immunity—the consequences of a refusal by the President to respond to a
subpoena—was not reached in the Burr case, and lay in abeyance until United
States v. Nixon.
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President is not subject to compulsory judicial process, but only to
impeachment.
The Argument from Principle
The President holds the executive power directly under Article
II, section 1, of the Constitution. The exercise of power by other
executive officers is derived from the President’s. There is little
question that other officers—cabinet officials, generals, clerks—are
subject to compulsory judicial process.8 Because their power is
derivative, it can be transferred to others as necessary or desirable.
They can be replaced instantly if detained or impeded by arrest,
indictment, subpoena, civil action, or inability. If the President, on
the other hand, is indicted or compelled to appear at a hearing, the
entire executive power may be impaired, or at least constrained in
some degree.9 If it were possible for another part of the government
to act against the President in this way—which would make the
United States fundamentally different from any other sovereign
8

Also, when the courts act against anyone else in the executive branch, in both
criminal and civil cases, they may do so on the basis of the validity of the
President’s actions. The consequences of a President’s unlawful acts therefore are
subject to judicial scrutiny, wholly apart from the President’s personal exposure to
judicial process. The references that occasionally surface in the debate over
presidential immunity to Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952) (court order validly directed to Secretary of Commerce), are wholly
inapposite. The following from Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 703, for example,
although offered by the Court as germane, has little or no bearing on the central
issue in that case: “[W]hen the President takes official action, the Court has the
authority to determine whether he has acted within the law. Perhaps the most
dramatic example of such a case is our holding that President Truman exceeded
his constitutional authority when he issued an order directing the Secretary of
Commerce to take possession of and operate most of the Nation’s steel mills in
order to avert a national catastrophe. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 96 L. Ed. 1153, 72 S. Ct. 863 (1952). Despite the serious impact of
that decision on the ability of the Executive Branch to accomplish its assigned
mission, and the substantial time that the President must necessarily have devoted
to the matter as a result of judicial involvement, we exercised our Article III
jurisdiction to decide whether his official conduct conformed to the law.”
9
On the specific question of indictment of a President in office, there is the further
technical problem that the President’s power of pardon could undo it.
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nation of the late 18th Century—one would expect it to be clearly
stated in the Constitution. And in point of fact, it is. The President
is expressly subject to impeachment by the House of Representatives
and trial in the Senate. In England, by contrast, the king was beyond
the reach of any official action of any part of government, including
impeachment. Extension of impeachment to the President was
something new, and brought the President more fully within the
reach of the law than any European head of state of the time of the
drafting of the Constitution.
The silence of the Constitution on the President’s exposure to
judicial process, in this light, is not neutral, but allows the inference
that impeachment is the sole form of official action against a
President in office, to the exclusion of judicial process.
This argument is strongly reinforced by further inferences
available from the relevant history.
The Early Understanding
It appears from the proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention of 1787—to a high degree of certainty in my view—that
the framers of the Constitution understood a fundamental relation
between presidential immunity and impeachment. For them
presidential immunity was the premise of the constitutional
provisions on impeachment. There was no hint at the Constitutional
Convention that the President would ever be subject to judicial
command, and not a few implications of the contrary. Moving to
closer range, the President’s immunity from judicial command is the
apparent premise of the extended debate on impeachment of July 20,
1787. At issue there was the exposure of the President to
impeachment and, by inference, to other official action of
government. From the debate it is plain, I believe, that impeachment
was understood on all sides as the only way to reach misconduct by
the President. Several proponents of the impeachment power argued
that, without it, the President would be above the law. George
Mason urged: “No point is of more importance than that the right of
impeachment should be continued. Shall any man be above Justice?
. . . When great crimes were committed he was for punishing the

7
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principal as well as the Coadjutors.”10 Elbridge Gerry “urged the
necessity of impeachments,” and “hoped that the maxim would never
be adopted here that the chief Magistrate could do <no> wrong.”11
For Edmund Randolph “[t]he propriety of impeachments was a
favorite principle … . Should no regular punishment be provided, it
will be irregularly inflicted by tumults and insurrections.”12 Randolph
was echoing a similar point of Benjamin Franklin’s:
What was the practice before this in cases where the chief
Magistrate rendered himself obnoxious? Why recourse was had
to assassination in [which] he was not only deprived of his life
but of the opportunity of vindicating his character. It [would] be
the best way therefore to provide in the Constitution for the
regular punishment of the Executive when his misconduct
should deserve it, and for his honorable acquittal when he
should be unjustly accused.13
Gouverneur Morris, who opposed a broad impeachment power, had
previously argued that there was no need for presidential
impeachment because “[The President] can do no criminal act
without Coadjutors who may be punished.”14 Morris’s remark, as
does Mason’s responding to it,15 assumes that the President himself
is beyond the reach of the courts. Otherwise, both the President and
his “coadjutors” could be punished. Indeed, the entire discussion of
July 20 is meaningless if the President is otherwise subject to judicial
power.16
10

2 Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 65 (rev. ed.
1937) [hereafter cited as Farrand].
11
Id. at 66.
12
Id. at 67.
13
Id. at 65.
14
Id. at 64.
15
See p.6 above.
16
At this stage of the deliberations, furthermore, the trier of impeachments was
not settled and could still have been the Supreme Court, upon an accusation
brought by the House of Representatives. This makes it even less plausible that the
President could be subject to judicial power in any other way. There would be little
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The immediate premise of the debate of July 20, 1787, to be
sure, is the immunity from criminal sanction of a President, in
default of an impeachment power. Impeachment is urged as
necessary to make a President answerable for “crimes” and “criminal
acts.” The President’s exposure to civil action in the courts does not
surface as explicitly. That, in my view, is because the idea does not
cross the threshold of plausibility: it would not have occurred to the
framers that a sovereign immune from criminal prosecution might be
subject to routine civil liability. To the framers I would think it
nearly self-evident that the greater immunity implied the lesser. To
test this view I invite the reader to scour the debate of July 20 with
the following question in mind: could the framers have contemplated
that a sitting President so far “above justice”17 in the courts that he
cannot be indicted for murder could nonetheless be sued in tort?
A generation later Joseph Story wrote in his Commentaries that
the President must be allowed to exercise the “incidental powers …
belonging to the executive … without any obstruction or
impediment whatsoever,” and that the “President cannot, therefore,
be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, while he is in the
discharge of the duties of his office; and for this purpose his person
must be deemed, in civil cases at least, to possess an official
inviolability.”18 The fair import of this comment, I believe, is that the
President personally is beyond the reach of the courts and, in civil
cases, beyond the reach of any official action, including
impeachment. In other words, the only possible official action
against a sitting President’s person is impeachment for crimes.
Echoing and extending Story’s comment, an 1838 Supreme Court
decision, Kendall v. United States, states as though a self-evident and
eternal verity that
The executive power is vested in a President; and as far as his
powers are derived from the constitution, he is beyond the reach
reason to contemplate special jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over the President
in impeachments if the President were routinely subject to judicial power.
17
Mason’s words. See p.6 above.
18
3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §1563, pp. 418419 (1833).
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of any other department, except in the mode prescribed by the
constitution through the impeaching power.19

In both Story’s Commentaries and Kendall appears a common
understanding that the President is not subject to compulsory
judicial process. In Kendall, furthermore, the President’s immunity
from judicial process is expressly understood as a corollary of his
exposure to impeachment. Together the import of these excerpts is
stronger than either separately. In the Kendall dictum standing alone
the words “as far as his powers are derived from the constitution”
could be construed as limiting its focus to presidential immunity for
official acts.20 Story’s comment, however, extends inviolability to the
President’s person in civil cases. Indeed, in light of Story’s comment,
the apposed words in Kendall can as readily be understood to mean
“as possessor of the executive power under the Constitution” and
refer to presidential immunity as broadly as Story does.21 Either way,
the thrust of both comments cuts only in the direction of presidential
immunity.
In Clinton v. Jones the majority disposes of Story’s comment
with an explanation to which, because I cannot do it justice by
paraphrase, I must allow its own voice: “Story said only that ‘an
official inviolability’ … was necessary to preserve the President’s
ability to perform the functions of the office; he did not specify the
dimensions of the necessary immunity. While we have held that an
immunity from suits grounded on official acts is necessary to serve
this purpose, see Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 749, it does not follow that
the broad immunity from all civil damages suits that petitioner seeks
is also necessary.” By this reasoning (?) the Court transforms Story’s
assertion of an “inviolability” (a notion with a strong flavor of the
absolute or all-encompassing22) that is “official” (meaning, one might
19

37 U.S. (12 Peters) 524, 610 (1838).
Even so construed the Kendall dictum does not, of course, deny presidential
immunity from judicial process for private acts. It is merely silent on the question.
21
Justice Story was on the Supreme Court at the time of Kendall v. United States,
and participated in the decision.
22
In the Federalist Hamilton describes the King of Great Britain as “inviolable,”
meaning that “there is no constitutional tribunal to which he is amenable.” The
20
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presume, “derived from the office”) into a yardstick with an
unexplained shifting unit of measure along the relevant
“dimensions.” As for Kendall, the majority in Clinton v. Jones handles
it more neatly, with utter silence.
At some point, evidently, between these beginnings and Clinton
v. Jones the early understanding of presidential immunity lost its
mooring, having given way to the notion that a President subject
only to impeachment would be in some manner above the law. The
precise extent of the President’s exposure to judicial process today is
far from clear. Joseph Story’s view that a President in office cannot
be indicted, arrested, or imprisoned apparently still holds.23 If
nothing else, the mechanics of indictment and trial of a holder of the
pardoning power portend labyrinthian difficulties. But United States
v. Nixon clearly holds the President subject personally to compulsory
process in criminal proceedings involving others, while Clinton v.
Jones holds him subject to private civil lawsuits, and the attendant
compulsory process, for nonofficial acts. Clinton v. Jones also brought
its own new formulation of the respective spheres of impeachment
and judicial action concerning misconduct, obligations, and liabilities
of the President. To the Supreme Court’s generalized
pronouncement in United States v. Nixon (“We therefore reaffirm
that it is the province and duty of this Court ‘to say what the law is’
Federalist No. 69, at 416 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). I therefore doubt that Story
meant “inviolability” in “civil cases” to mean “except in private tort actions.”
23
Special prosecutor Starr sent his report on the grand jury to Congress, for
possible impeachment, and did not proceed in court. The Independent Counsel
statute instructs the special prosecutor to report possible impeachable offenses to
Congress, but does not expressly bar proceedings directly against the President. 28
USC §595(c) (“An independent counsel shall advise the House of Representatives
of any substantial and credible information which such independent counsel
receives, in carrying out the independent counsel’s responsibilities under this
chapter, that may constitute grounds for an impeachment.”).
Later, toward the end of the impeachment proceedings, there were leaks
from the special prosecutor’s office suggesting that Starr did in fact consider a
sitting President subject to indictment. See The President’s Trial: The
Independent Counsel Starr is Weighing Whether to Indict Sitting President, New
York Times, January 31, 1999, Late Edition-Final, Section 1; Page 1; Column 6;
National Desk. There is further discussion on p.53 below.
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with respect to the claim of privilege presented in this case.”24)
Clinton v. Jones adds the more fully articulated proposition that:
[w]ith respect to acts taken in his “public character”—that is
official acts—the President may be disciplined principally by
impeachment, not by private lawsuits for damages … [b]ut he is
otherwise subject to the laws for his purely private acts.25
Closer scrutiny of the Court’s encapsulation in Clinton v. Jones
brings out the full incoherence of present law. On its face, the
Court’s statement does not exclude—indeed invites—possible arrest
or indictment of a President for such “purely private acts” as crimes
directed at private persons.26 That is, inescapably, what it means to
be “subject to the laws” for “purely private acts.” Murder of a private
person, or shoplifting, are not official acts, and being “subject to the
laws” (unless the Court is following the semantic practice of H.
Dumpty27) means possible arrest, indictment, and trial.28 If, on the
other hand, the Court did not mean what it manifestly said—and it
still holds true that the President is not subject to arrest, indictment,
24

418 U.S. at 705.
520 U.S. at 696. Note the sponginess of the Court’s language in this crucial
statement. That the President may be disciplined “principally” by impeachment for
official acts implies some residual or “minor” exposure to judicial process for those
same acts. Is that what the Court means, or is it just too unsure of itself to do
without waffly modifiers?
26
There is a similar implication in the Court’s pronouncement that “if the federal
judiciary may … direct appropriate process to the President himself, it must follow
that the federal courts have power to determine the legality of his unofficial
conduct.” Id. at 705.
27
See Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass (Signet ed. 1960) at 186
(“‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said … ‘it means just what I choose it to
mean—neither more nor less.”).
28
In January 1999 the New York Times reported that Kenneth Starr had
concluded, on the strength of Clinton v. Jones, that a prosecutor could seek the
indictment, trial, and conviction of a sitting President. The President’s Trial: The
Independent Counsel Starr is Weighing Whether to Indict Sitting President, New
York Times, January 31, 1999, Late Edition-Final, Section 1; Page 1; Column 6;
National Desk. Any such inference drawn by Starr from Clinton v. Jones was
entirely justified, even if beyond the contemplation of the Supreme Court itself.
25
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or imprisonment—then a President can be sued in tort but not
arrested or indicted for murder. And while you are asking yourself
how weird is that, consider as well, in such a patchwork regime of
presidential immunity, how exactly a President can be subject to civil
suit? Suppose the President just says no, and ignores the suit. Jail for
contempt, by hypothesis, is out of the question.29 Therefore
impeachment becomes the backstop of civil suits against the
President.
The view of presidential immunity implicit in Clinton v. Jones,
when pressed, thus defies reason as well as the available inferences
from history.
For many, of course, fidelity to historical meaning is not the
sole, or even major concern. Most do, however, want a constitutional
scheme that makes good day-to-day sense. In that regard, the
urgency of leaving a President exposed to compulsory judicial process
depends importantly on the scope of impeachment, as even the
Supreme Court appears to understand in Clinton v. Jones. If in
impeachment we find an instrument sufficient to protect the public
at all events against misconduct by the President, then United States
v. Nixon and Clinton v. Jones lose considerable force. An essential
step, therefore, in thinking through the question of presidential
immunity is to bring the scope of impeachment into the sharpest
possible focus.
The Scope of Impeachment
On this score I have good news. A close reading of the
constitutional provisions on impeachment brings a remarkably
clear—indeed nearly unequivocal—understanding of the scope of
impeachment. And to find it, one need only look closely at the
words of the Constitution.
29

I need hardly add that the premise is unreal. Some sort of physical power is
necessary to support any compulsion exercised by a court. Therefore any exposure
of the President to compulsory judicial process ultimately implies significant
exposure to detention and indictment. Conversely, to concede the President’s
immunity from indictment and detention ultimately brings into doubt any judicial
action.
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The reader, quite possibly, will react skeptically to this claim.
Commentators on impeachment have found great uncertainty in the
constitutional provisions and relevant history, and differ widely
among themselves.30 If there were a clear meaning to be found,
wouldn’t they know about it? Surely, you may think, scholars have
pored over the constitutional provisions on impeachment, especially
scholars commenting on the late proceedings involving President
Clinton. How else would one find out the scope of impeachment?
Think again. American lawyers, including constitutional scholars,
take a somewhat Olympian approach to the Constitution, preferring
broad-brush overview to hard grappling with the nuts and bolts.
Some find that the actual text distracts them from their main
concerns.31
If asked at almost any time in the past 50 years32 about the
constitutional provisions on impeachment, an American
constitutional scholar (not just any lawyer) would have answered
something like: “Well, the constitution defines impeachable offenses
as treason, bribery, and high crimes and misdemeanors.”33 This
30

The view has also surfaced that the impeachment provisions, reflecting the
political nature of the process, cannot be clearly apprehended. See Michael
Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its Alternatives, 68
Tex. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1989) (“[T]he impeachment clauses … virtually defy systematic
analysis precisely because impeachment is by nature, structure, and design an
essentially political process.”).
31
When I outlined the analysis of impeachment presented here to an eminent
constitutional scholar, the response was, “You’re just talking to me about words. I
don’t care about that.”
32
The only exception might have been a few weeks in early 1999 when the theory
of impeachment expounded here received brief public attention.
33
I can’t help noticing that in an article on impeachment my colleague Cass
Sunstein, after allowing that “[t]he text of the Constitution is the place to begin,”
goes on: “It says that a President may be removed for ‘Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors.’” Cass R. Sunstein, Impeaching the President,
147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 279, 282 (1999). Actually, it doesn’t exactly say that: it says
that the President shall be removed upon impeachment and conviction of those
offenses. Therein lies much of the story, elided in Sunstein’s article before it
begins. There is another, somewhat comical, instance of detachment from the text
in Vikram Amar’s review of Ann Coulter’s book on the Clinton impeachment.
Scolding Coulter for lack of focus on the precise terms of the Constitution, Amar
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understanding of impeachment is so widespread that the words
“high crimes and misdemeanors” have come to be synonymous in
common discourse with “impeachable offenses.”34 A similar
understanding can be found in most of the recent scholarly writing
on the subject.35
Now let’s see what the Constitution actually says about
impeachment. This will come as a surprise to many readers,
including some whose profession is thinking about the Constitution.
A close reading of the Constitution, coupled with some exploration
of relevant history, reveals that 1) impeachable offenses are not
defined in the Constitution, 2) “high crimes and misdemeanors” are
an historically well-defined category of offenses aimed specifically
against the state, for which removal from office is mandatory upon
conviction by the Senate, 3) Congress has the power to impeach and
writes: “Remarkably, Ms. Coulter never carefully parses the provision in the
Constitution that is most closely on point—Article II’s statement that the
President (and other civil officers) can be impeached, convicted and removed for
‘bribery, treason and other high crimes and misdemeanors.’ Ms. Coulter simply
never analyzes, as a good lawyer must, what the text says.” Vikram Amar, The
Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth about “High Crimes and
Misdemeanors” and the Constitution’s Impeachment Process, 16 Const.
Commentary 403, 407 (1999) (review of Ann Coulter’s High Crimes and
Misdemeanors: The Case Against Bill Clinton). If you don’t see the humor here, take
a close look at Article II, section 4, which conveniently is analyzed in the rest of
this article.
34
See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, What Ken Starr Neglected to tell Us, New York
Times, September 14, 1998 (asserting “high crimes and misdemeanors” as the
constitutional “test” of impeachment).
35
See, e.g., Irving Brant, Impeachment (1972) [hereafter cited as Brant]; Raoul
Berger, Impeachment: the Constitutional Problems (1973) [hereafter cited as Berger];
Michael J. Gerhardt, The Federal Impeachment Process (1996): Ann Coulter, High
Crimes and Misdemeanors (1998). But see The Scope of the Power to Impeach, 84
Yale L. J. 1316 (1975) (student note by Joseph Isenbergh).
Since the conclusion of the trial of President Clinton, at least one article has
appeared expressing doubts about the conventional understanding of
impeachment. See Mark R. Slusar, The Confusion Defined: Questions and
Problems of Process in the Aftermath of the Clinton Impeachment, 49 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 869 (1999). Slusar analyzes many of the doctrinal contentions that
arose during the proceedings, with sound critical judgment in my view.
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remove civil officers for a range of offenses other than high crimes
and misdemeanors, and 4) the Senate can impose sanctions less
severe than removal from office—censure, for example—on civil
officers convicted of such other offenses.
These points are expounded fully in the following pages. To
afford the reader some landmarks, let me start with an outline of
impeachment in broad overview. Federal impeachment is a criminal
process of accusation and trial carried out in Congress. Like all
criminal process impeachment has the ultimate goal of protecting
the public from wrongdoing. Its object historically has been holders
of important public office. While not defined in the Constitution,
impeachable offenses are framed by the history of impeachment
itself, and inherently involve serious misconduct.
Article II, Section 4
The most widely cited provision on impeachment in the
Constitution is Article II, section 4, which reads:
The President, Vice President, and all civil officers of the
United States shall be removed from Office on Impeachment
for and conviction of Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes
and Misdemeanors.
These words do not define impeachable offenses. They are not
literally a definition at all. Rather, they require that a President and
others, if convicted upon impeachment of various serious offenses, be
removed from office. “Shall be removed” is a command, not a
definition.36 Placed at the end of Article II, this clause says
peremptorily that if the President and other civil officers are
convicted of certain bad acts, Congress must throw them out. Article
II, section 4, in short, asserts a mandatory penalty of removal for
certain crimes of civil officers.
36

“Shall” has imperative force everywhere in the Constitution when it occurs in an
independent clause. Every command in the Constitution is couched in terms of
“shall.” See, e.g., Martin v, Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 328-33
(1816). There were exchanges at the Federal Convention confirming that the
framers attached imperative force to “shall.” See 2 Farrand at 377, 412-13.
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Although it enumerates several impeachable offenses, nothing
in Article II, section 4 indicates that it is an exhaustive listing. That
civil officers must be removed for “treason, bribery, or other high
crimes and misdemeanors,” does not preclude the existence of other
misconduct for which they may be impeached and removed. For
Article II, section 4, to be an exhaustive listing, “shall be removed
for” must be taken as somehow equivalent to “shall be removed only
for.” When the drafters of the Constitution wanted to give a
restrictive definition, however, they knew how to do so
unambiguously, as in their definition of treason in Article III,
section 3.37 One has to work against the text to find in Article II,
section 4, a definition of all impeachable offenses rather than a
specification of those offenses for which removal from office is
mandatory upon conviction.
This reading of Article II, section 4, is systematically confirmed
in other provisions on impeachment in the Constitution. The
impeachment power is granted to Congress in Article I:
The House of Representatives . . . shall have the sole Power
of Impeachment.38
...
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all
Impeachments.39
The term “Impeachment” appears in these provisions without
explanation, as though well understood. Terms so used in the
Constitution were taken in 1787 (and sometimes even today) in their
established sense.40 Impeachable offenses both in England and
America had included a broad range of misconduct other than “high
37

“Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against
them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.”
38
Article I, section 2.
39
Article I, section 3.
40
In 1807, Chief Justice Marshall wrote of another such phrase, “levying war”: “It
is scarcely conceivable that the term was not employed by the framers of Our
constitution in the sense which had been affixed to it by those from whom we
borrowed it.” United States v. Burr 25 F. Cas. 55, 159 (No. 14,693) (C.C.D. Va.
1807). See also Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1925).
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crimes and misdemeanors.”41 Thus if Article II, section 4, is to be
taken, against its words, as an exhaustive listing of impeachable
offenses, it also represents a sharp break with earlier practice. Had
the framers intended such a break, they could have accomplished it
more clearly than by commanding removal for high crimes and
misdemeanors in Article II after providing a general grant of the
power to impeach in Article I.
Beyond these generalities, there is more specific confirmation of
this reading of Article II, section 4, in Article I, section 3:
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than
to removal from Office and disqualification to hold or enjoy an
Office of honor, Trust, or Profit under the United States.42
The limitation on the severity of judgments bears on the scope of the
impeachment power in several ways. First, it confirms the drafters’
ability to be explicit when departing from English precedents.
Article I, section 3, prohibits the more severe penalties allowed in
England.43 Had the framers also wanted to provide for a narrower
range of impeachable offenses, they could have put a similar
limitation in the Article in which they granted to Congress the
powers of impeachment.
Second, the words “judgment . . . shall not extend further than
to . . .” do allow judgments to extend less far than removal and
disqualification. Lesser judgments than removal were possible in
English impeachments. Among the penalties in impeachments
acknowledged by Blackstone, along with severe punishments such as
banishment, imprisonment, and fines, are forfeiture of office,
perpetual disability, and “discretionary censure, regulated by the
41

See pp. 25-31 below.
(Emphasis added.)
43
As the framers were well aware, see Berger, note 35 above, at 4 n.21, 30 n.107,
87 n.l60, 122 n.4 143 n.97, the English House of Lords had handed down a wide
variety of judgments in impeachment cases. Compare, for example, the cases of
Henry Sacheverell, 15 State Trials 1, 39, 474 (Howell 1710) (temporary
suspension from preaching) and of Theophilis Field, 2 State Trials 1087, 1118
(Howell 1620) (censure), with the case of Lord Lovat, 18 State Trials 529, 838
(Howell 1746) (hanging, drawing and quartering).
42
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nature and aggravations of the offence committed.”44 It can hardly
have been beyond the framers’ powers, had they wanted to foreclose
any other possibility, to write that the only judgments in cases of
impeachment shall be removal and disqualification. At least one
18th century lawyer was able to express that idea unambiguously.
Thomas Jefferson’s 1783 draft of a proposed constitution for
Virginia contains the following: “[A]nd the only sentence they shall
have authority to pass shall be that of deprivation and future
incapacity of office.”45
Third, and most importantly, Article I, section 3, undercuts any
reading of Article II, section 4, as a comprehensive statement of
impeachable offenses. With removal and disqualification the outer
limits of a range of judgments, Article II, section 4—which
commands only one of the extreme judgments permitted in Article
1, section 3—would be badly drafted as the vehicle for defining the
entire range of impeachable offenses. It follows that Article II,
section 4, is no such thing. Rather, Article II, section 4, lists a
category of crimes for which no lesser judgment than removal is
possible.
A further textual clue lies in Article II, section 4, itself. If that
provision is an exhaustive statement of the impeachment power,
defining both impeachable offenses and impeachable persons, then
military officers cannot be impeached at all, even for treason.46 The
omission of military officers from Article II, section 4, not readily
fathomable at first sight, becomes more sensible when the clause is
correctly understood as requiring removal in some cases and nothing
more. The Senate may remove a military officer convicted of bribery,
for example, but need not, and may do nothing more than
reprimand or deny a promotion. A possible reason for restraint in a

44

4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *121, *141 [hereafter cited as Blackstone].
There is further discussion of the hierarchy of penalties in impeachment on pp.
48-49 below.
45
The Jeffersonian Cyclopedia 416 (J. Foley ed. 1967) (emphasis added).
46
Article II, section 4, please note, deals with the removal of civil officers only.
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given case might lie in a particular balance of public protection and
military exigency.47
There is yet more confirmation of this reading of Article II,
section 4, in the provision of Article III for the tenure of judges,
which is discussed below.48
Once Article II, section 4, is understood, not as defining the
impeachment power or impeachable offenses, but as requiring
removal in certain cases, two further questions arise. First, why does
the Constitution specifically require removal from office upon
conviction of “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and
misdemeanors”? Second, if not limited to this enumerated type, what
are impeachable offenses? Here too, the answer to both questions is
surprisingly clear in light of the relevant history.
“High Crimes and Misdemeanors”
The core of the conventional view of impeachment—derived
from an erroneous reading of Article II, section 4, in my view—is
that “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors” make
up the constitutional standard of impeachable offenses. The
conventional understanding, however, offers no clear notion of what
“high crimes and misdemeanors” are. Commentators on
impeachment differ widely among themselves over what constitutes
a “high crime or misdemeanor.” Having little focus on the historical
meaning of these words, writers tend to choose a meaning consistent
47

Robert Harper, a Manager in the first federal impeachment trial (of former
Senator William Blount in 1799) made this very point:
[The object of Article II, section 4] is, not to designate the persons who shall
be liable to impeachment, but to prevent the Senate, in the exercise of their
discretion, from retaining in a civil office, a person convicted of “treason,
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.” … [T]he distinction …
between civil officers, and other officers … may, however, be supposed to have
arisen from an opinion, certainly well founded, that, under certain
circumstances, there might be danger, or great inconvenience, in removing
from his command, a military officer, whom, nevertheless, it might be very
proper to censure or suspend, or even to disqualify for some particular offices.
8 Annals of Congress 2302 (Senate, 5th Congress, 3rd Session) (1799).
48
See pp. 31-33.
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with their preferences concerning proceedings in view at the time of
their writing.49 Much writing on impeachment consistently
overlooks straightforward historical indications of the scope of “high
crimes and misdemeanors” and impeachable offenses generally.50
A little digging into legal authorities well-known in 1787
reveals what “high crimes and misdemeanors” are and why they are
specifically stated grounds of mandatory removal in Article II,
section 4. The reason lies in the meaning of the word “high.”
Without the word “high” attached to it, the expression “crimes and
misdemeanors” is nothing more than a description of public wrongs,
offenses that are cognizable in some court of criminal jurisdiction.
Blackstone, speaking of the criminal law, begins: “We are now
arrived at the fourth and last branch of these commentaries, which
treats of public wrongs or crimes and misdemeanors . . . ” and later
continues: “A crime or misdemeanor, is an act committed, or
omitted, in violation of a public law, either forbidding or
commanding it.”51
In the 18th Century the word “high,” when attached to the
word “crime” or “misdemeanor,” describes a crime aiming at the state
or the sovereign rather than a private person. A “high crime or
misdemeanor” is not simply a serious crime, but one aimed at the

49

Berger concludes that “high crimes and misdemeanors,” and therefore
impeachable offenses, amount to serious misconduct, but are not limited to crimes.
See Berger at 53-102 (esp. 91-93). Brant concludes that “high crimes and
misdemeanors” consist only of crimes indictable under federal law and violations of
oaths of office. See Brant at 23. During the Watergate affair the staff of the House
Judiciary Committee took a position close to that of Berger. See Impeachment
Inquiry Staff of House Comm. On the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment 1, 4 (Comm. Print 1974).
President Nixon’s lawyers took a position very near that of Brant. See St. Clair, An
Analysis of the Constitutional Standard for Impeachment, in Presidential
Impeachment: A Documentary Overview 40-73 (M. Schnapper ed. 1974).
These views resurfaced in the Clinton impeachment, reshuffled in light of
different forensic perspectives.
50
But see Arthur Bestor, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems, 49 Wash.
L. Rev. 255 (1973) (review of Berger).
51
4 Blackstone at *1, *5.
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high powers of the state. “High” has denoted crimes against the state
since the Middle Ages.52
This meaning of “high” was known to the lawyers of 1787. Part
III of Coke’s Institutes—standard fare for lawyers of the 18th
century53—begins with a chapter on high treason, followed by a
chapter on petit treason, the first sentence of which demonstrates
that for Coke “high” meant “against the sovereign”: “It was called
high or grand treason in respect of the royall majesty against whom
it is committed, and comparatively it is called petit treason … in
respect it is committed against subjects and inferior persons … .”54
Blackstone reasserts this meaning of “high,”55 describing various
“misprisions” and “contempts … immediately against the king and
government” as “all such high offences as are under the degree of
capital.”56 Blackstone’s enumeration of “high misdemeanors” under
52

The first appearance of the word “high” with this meaning in impeachments
may have been in the proceedings against Robert de Vere and Michael de la Pole
in 1386: “[I]t was declared that in so high a crime as is alleged in this appeal, which
touches the person of the king, our Lord, and the state of his entire realm … .” 3 Rotuli
Parliamentorum [Rolls of Parliament] 236 (undated) (emphasis added) (passage
from the rolls of Parliament for the years 1387-88, translated by the author from
the original French: “[estoit declare], Que en si haute crime come est pretendu en
cest Appell, q [qui] touche la persone du Roi ñre [nostre] dit Sr [Seigneur], &
I’estat de tout son Roialme … .”)
53
See, e.g., 10 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 376 (P. Ford ed. 1899); William
Koch, Reopening Tennessee’s Open Courts Clause: A Historical Reconsideration
of Article I, Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution, 27 Mem. St. U.L. Rev.
333, 348, 361, 363 (1997); Robert Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1991 1990
Wis L. Rev. 941, 958, 992-995 (1990); Christopher Vizas, Law and Political
Expression in the American Revolution, Feb. 1975 (unpublished paper on file
with Yale Law Journal) (thorough survey of Coke’s stature in colonial America).
54
3 Edward Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England; Concerning High Treason
and Other Pleas of the Crown 19 (1817).
55
Blackstone continues Coke’s classification of treason as “high” and “petit.” 4
Blackstone at *75. Like Coke, Blackstone was widely known in colonial America.
See, e.g., 3 Jonathan Elliot, Debates in the Several State Conventions on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution 501 (1836) (remark by James Madison
regarding Blackstone) [hereafter cited as Elliot]; Robert Riggs, Substantive Due
Process in 1991 1990 Wis L. Rev. 941, 992-995 (1990).
56
4 Blackstone at *119. (Emphasis added.)

Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper

22

this heading includes “maladministration,” embezzlement of public
money, various misprisions “against the king and government,” and
violence or threats of violence against a judge.57 Blackstone also lists
endeavoring “to dissuade a witness against giving evidence.”58
Blackstone’s taxonomy establishes both the nature of “high” offenses
and the difference between them and serious (i.e. “capital”) crimes
generally.59 I do not mean to suggest, I should add, that “high crimes
and misdemeanors” in Article II, section 4, are to be taken as
congruent with offenses identified as “high” by Blackstone, but
simply that the import of the term “high” attached to crimes is clear
in Blackstone’s Commentaries.60
The form of the phrase “treason, bribery, or other high crimes
and misdemeanors” in Article II, section 4, indicates that “treason”
and “bribery” are also “high” crimes. The definition of treason in the
Constitution61 is taken verbatim from Blackstone’s definition of
“high” treason.62 Thus the first enumerated crime in Article II,
57

Id. at *121-26.
Id. at *126. In case you were wondering, this appears to consist of trying to keep
a witness from appearing at all rather than suggesting false testimony.
59
There is also a difference between “high” crimes and crimes “against the King’s
peace,” the latter words being a necessary incantation to bring any offense within
the jurisdiction of the King’s courts. 1 Blackstone at *118, *268, *350; 4 Blackstone
at *444 (appendix).
60
Blackstone describes one other “high misdemeanor,” to wit, knowingly receiving
stolen goods, under the heading “Offenses Against Public Justice.” Id. at *132.
This is not an immediately obvious crime against the state. Blackstone’s discussion
is a little cryptic, but the classification appears to be a fiction designed to overcome
the difficulties of prosecuting receivers of stolen goods at common law without
concurrent or prior conviction of the thief. The receiver who knew goods were
stolen was therefore deemed to be interfering with justice, and could be prosecuted
on this ground independently of the thief. Even though strained, this use of “high”
implies action against the course of government. It is, if you will, the fiction that
confirms the rule. Again, I do not offer Blackstone as a talisman, but as
confirming the basic notion of a “high” crime at common law.
61
Article III, section 3 (“Treason against the United States, shall consist only in
levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and
Comfort.”).
62
4 Blackstone at *81-82.
58
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section 4, is unequivocally a “high” crime. Bribery of a public official
was also a crime against the state at common law, being limited to
the making or taking of payments to influence the course of justice.63
“High crimes and misdemeanors” thus refer to crimes that harm
the state in an immediate way and impair its functioning. Examples
of high crimes include treason, bribery, espionage, obstruction of
justice in federal criminal proceedings, sabotage of government
property, and embezzling or stealing from the public treasury.
The proceedings of the 1787 Constitutional Convention
strongly imply this understanding of “high crimes and
misdemeanors” among the framers. The version of Article II, section
4, originally reported to the Convention from the Committee of
Eleven listed as offenses only treason and bribery.64 The Convention
added the terms “high crimes and misdemeanors against the State.”65
The words “against the State” were subsequently deleted from this
clause, being first replaced by “against the United States” in order “to
remove ambiguity.”66 The words “against the United States” were
then removed without explanation by the Committee of Style.67 The
Committee of Style, unlike other committees of the Convention,
was not authorized to make any changes in meaning.68 This allows
the strong inference that the drafters considered the words “against
the United States” redundant in this clause. Further underscoring
this understanding, Representative Lawrence of New York, speaking
in the First Congress, referred to Article II, section 4, of the
Constitution as preventing the retention in office of persons “guilty
of crimes or misdemeanors against the Government.”69

63

Id. At *139.
See 2 Farrand 550.
65
Id. (emphasis added).
66
Id. at 551. The “state” in question in federal impeachments is of course the
United States.
67
Id. at 575, 600.
68
Id. at 553; cf. 3 id. at 499.
69
1 Annals of Congress 392-93 (1789) (running head: “Gales & Seaton’s History
of Debates in Congress”).
64
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There is other evidence from the Constitutional Convention
that the framers did not consider “high misdemeanors” to be a grabbag of unspecified offenses, but crimes directed at the state. When a
draft provision for extradition by the states of “any person charged
with treason, felony or high misdemeanor” was considered, the
words “high misdemeanor” were replaced with “other crime,” (as
Article IV, section 2, now reads) because it was “doubtful whether
‘high misdemeanor’ had not a technical meaning too limited.”70 In
the debate of August 20 on treason, which is held out as “an offence
against the Sovereignty”71 there is a particularly telling observation of
Rufus King, who points out that the definition of treason “excludes
any treason against particular States,”72 adding that “[t]hese may
however punish offences” against them “as high misdemesnors.”73
This meaning of “high” explains why Article II, section 4,
requires removal for “high crimes and misdemeanors.” It bars the
retention in office of civil officers convicted of wrongdoing that
harms the state itself. Because it does not concern itself with
wrongdoing that strikes elsewhere, however, Article II, section 4, is
not plausible as a comprehensive definition of impeachable
offenses.74 Any number of the most serious crimes—murder, bank
robbery, rape—are not “high” crimes.75 Article II, section 4, does not
prevent impeachment and removal for such crimes. It simply does
70

2 Farrand at 443.
2 Farrand at 346 (remark of Johnson).
72
This is so because the definition of treason in the Constitution is limited to
treason against the United States.
73
Id. At 348.
74
Even if it were conceivable to leave a President who had committed other
crimes (such as murder) beyond the reach of impeachment—on the ground, for
example, that only harm to the state warrants removal—it is unimaginable to do
the same for federal judges. See pp. 32-33 below.
75
One commentator gives murder and rape as “manifest grounds of removal for
high crimes.” Brant, note 35 above, at 43. In this Brant appears to equate “high”
with “serious.” But neither murder nor rape were “high” crimes at common law
(unless directed at the sovereign). Given this, Brant’s observation (albeit
unwittingly) demolishes the conventional reading of the impeachment provisions
in the Constitution.
71
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not require removal upon conviction. The conventional reading of
Article II, section 4, by contrast, leaves the Congress without
recourse against a President in office who has committed these
crimes and, until the passage of the 25th Amendment in 1967,
would have left the nation without recourse against a President’s
incapacity or madness.76
The Range of Impeachable Offenses
Given the meaning of “high” crimes, Article II, section
4—which by its terms does not prevent impeachment for other
misconduct—cannot reasonably describe the full range of
impeachable offenses. This raises the inevitable next question: what
is impeachment for? Here also there is an answer in the text of the
Constitution and the relevant history.
Impeachment is for crimes. It is, simply, a form of criminal
process conducted in Congress. There is an immediate indication of
the character of impeachment in Article III, section 2: “The Trial of
all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury … .”
This clause, by the qualifying words “except in Cases of
Impeachment” places impeachment squarely in the family of
criminal proceedings. Similarly, the President’s power in Article II,
section 2, to grant reprieves and pardons does not apply “in Cases of
Impeachment.” Further underscoring the nature of impeachment as
a criminal process is the provision in Article I, section 3, that the
“party convicted” in an impeachment trial remains liable to
indictment and trial at law. No exception to the principles of double
jeopardy would be necessary if impeachment were not a criminal
process.
These textual indications gain considerable force from the
history of impeachment in England and America. The framers
adopted the impeachment power against a well-known common law
background of English and American practice. Indeed, there was an
impeachment actually under way in England at the time of the

76

See also p.33 below.
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Federal Convention.77 From the history of impeachment before 1787
it is possible to reconstruct the general understanding of
impeachment that an American lawyer would have had in 1787.
Impeachment emerges from this exercise as a common law criminal
process, an area of jurisdiction with some power to shape itself, but
also governed by precedent.
Throughout its history in England and America, impeachment
was concerned with crimes. Blackstone described impeachment as “a
presentment to the most high and supreme court of criminal
jurisdiction by the most solemn grand inquest of the whole
kingdom.”78 To say that impeachment lies for crimes, however, is
only a starting point of analysis and does not mean that an
impeachable crime was a statutory crime or an indictable crime
triable in the King’s courts. Impeachment was a criminal process
with its own body of precedent. Because the jurisdiction of
Parliament as a court of impeachment was separate, it was not bound
by the precedents of the King’s courts. Impeachable offenses within
the jurisdiction of Parliament were governed only by the law of
Parliament.79 Blackstone allowed that impeachable crimes were
something of a class apart:
For, though in general the union of the legislative and judicial
powers ought to be more carefully avoided, yet it may happen
that a subject entrusted with the administration of public affairs
may infringe the rights of the people, and be guilty of such
crimes as the ordinary magistrate either dares not or cannot
punish.80

77

The impeachment of Warren Hastings. See the remarks of George Mason at
the Constitutional Convention, p.36 below.
78
4 Blackstone at *259.
79
See, e.g., Grantham v. Gordon, decided in 1719 by the Lords: “[I]mpeachments
in Parliament differed from indictments, and might be justified by the law and
course of Parliament.” 24 Eng, Rep. 539, 541 (H.L. 1719).
80
4 Blackstone at *260-61. This idea is repeated almost exactly by Wooddeson. 2
R. Wooddeson, A Systematical View of the Laws of England 596 (1972)
[hereafter cited as Wooddeson].
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This does not, however, change the fundamental character of
impeachment as a criminal process. Indeed, Blackstone had also
previously asserted that an impeachment was the “prosecution of the
already known and established law … ”81
While undoubtedly a criminal process, impeachment was not
limited specifically to “high crimes and misdemeanors.” Throughout
its history in England and America impeachment had extended to
other offenses.
In England there were, as one would expect, impeachments for
treason and corruption. But there were also impeachments for other
misconduct both in and out of office.82 In 1681, the House of
Commons resolved:
That it is the undoubted right of the Commons, in parliament
assembled, to impeach before the Lords in Parliament, any peer
or Commoner for treason or any other crime or misdemeanor.83

81

4 Blackstone at *259. This distinguishes impeachments from attainders. See id.
Case of Lord Mordaunt, 6 State Trials 785, 790 (Howell 1660) (preventing
another from standing for Parliament, and making uncivil addresses to a young
lady); Case of Chief Justice Scroggs, 8 State Trials 163, 200 (Howell 1680)
(“frequent and notorious excesses and debaucheries”); 4 J. Hatsell, Precedents of
the Proceedings in the House of Commons 126 (1818) (“advising and assisting in
the drawing and passing of ‘A Proclamation Against Tumultuous Petitions’”);
Case of Peter Pett, 6 State Trials 865, 866-88 (Howell 1668) (negligent
preparation before an enemy invasion, losing a ship through carelessness, and
sending the wrong type of planks to serve as platforms for cannon); Case of
Edward Seymour, 8 State Trials 127, 128-36 (Howell 1680) (applying funds to
public purposes other than those for which they had been appropriated).
83
Case of Edward Fitzharris, 8 State Trials 223, 236-37 (Howell 1681). See also
J. Selden, Of the Judicature in Parliaments 6 (1690) (House of Lords may proceed
upon impeachment against any person for any offense).
The 1681 resolution was part of a dispute, never entirely settled, between the
Commons and the Lords, over which classes of persons were subject to trial by the
Lords upon impeachment. See 2 Wooddeson at 601. Blackstone thought that a
commoner could not be impeached for a capital offense, but only for a “high
misdemeanor” (a crime against the state, not carrying the death penalty), while a
peer could be impeached for any crime. See 4 Blackstone at *259. Other
commentators took a different view of the restrictions on the scope of
82
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Thomas Jefferson had precisely this understanding of the
English precedent. In his Manual of Parliamentary Practice Jefferson
wrote that the Lords “may proceed against the delinquent, of
whatsoever degree, and whatsoever be the nature of the offence.”84
In the entire body of impeachment cases and commentary in
England impeachable offenses are not once held out as congruent
with “high crimes and misdemeanors.”85 The view of some
commentators86 that “high crimes and misdemeanors” described the
entire range of impeachable offenses in England is therefore
unsustainable.87 What may have misled commentators on this point
impeachment of commoners. See case of Edward Fitzharris at 231-32 & n.t, 236
n.* (note by Howell); cf. 2 Wooddeson at 601&n.m.
84
Thomas Jefferson, Manual of Parliamentary Practice v, vi, 113 (1857). Jefferson
also gave the entire body of English rules as controlling in cases of impeachment
conducted in the U.S. Congress. Id. at 112-17.
85
Wooddeson, whose Laws of England were widely quoted at American
impeachment trials (see, e.g., 8 Annals of Congress 2266, 2287, 2299 (1799)), also
indicates clearly that impeachment lies for offenses other than “high crimes and
misdemeanors.” 2 Wooddeson at 601, 606. James Fitzjames Stephen concludes
that “peers may be tried for any offence, and commoners for any offence not being
treason or felony upon an accusation or impeachment by the House of Commons,
which is the grand jury of the whole nation.” James Stephen, A History of the
Criminal Law in England 146 (1883). None of these writers anywhere proposes
“high crimes and misdemeanors” as the standard for impeachment. Moreover,
English law dictionaries from the 18th and early 19th Centuries give “crimes and
misdemeanors” rather than “high crimes and misdemeanors” as the standard for
impeachment. See, e.g., Jacob’s Law Dictionary (O. Ruffhead & J. Morgan eds.
1773). Tomlins Law Dictionary (T. Granger ed. 1836).
86
See, e.g., Berger, note 35 above, at 67.
87
Berger has difficulty reconciling the narrow scope of “high” misdemeanors in
Blackstone with the range of impeachable offenses in English history. See Berger,
note 35 above, at 61-62, 86, 89, 92. In other writings Berger concludes 1) that
“high crimes and misdemeanors” are words of art specifically describing
impeachable offenses, and meaning something other than “crimes and
misdemeanors” modified by “high,” and 2) that “nor were ordinary ‘misdemeanors’
a criterion for impeachments.” Raoul Berger, The President, Congress, and the
Courts, 83 Yale L.J. 1111, 1145 (1974). Both conclusions are dubious. On the
former, see Clayton Roberts, The Law of Impeachment in Stuart England: A
Reply to Raoul Berger, 84 Yale L.J. 1419 (1975). As to the latter, ordinary
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is that the words “high crimes and misdemeanors” were routinely
used in the official language of impeachment proceedings—articles
and pleadings—in the 17th and 18th centuries.88 But by then these
words had become jurisdictional formalities, incantations like “by
force and arms” in complaints for trespass before the King s courts.89
In America, where the history of impeachment reaches back to
the 17th century,90 “high crimes and misdemeanors” were no more
“misdemeanors” definitely were a standard of impeachment, as demonstrated
below.
88
See Alexander Simpson, A Treatise on Federal Impeachments 143-90 (1916).
89
See, e.g., 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 5 n.c
(R. Kerr ed. 1962) (note by Edward Christian, a late 18th century commentator):
“When the words high crimes and misdemeanors are used in prosecutions for
impeachment, the words high crimes have no definite signification, but are used
merely to give greater solemnity to the charge.” If the words “high crimes” fall out
of the phrase “high crimes and misdemeanors” as conventional surplusage, what
remains is simply “misdemeanors,” i.e., basic criminal wrongdoing. See also
Berger, note 35 above, at 59 & n.20.
When a writ of assumpsit referred to a breach of contract “by force and arms” no
actual force or arms were involved. Similarly the incantatory “high” in articles of
impeachment did not mean that an actual “high” crime was at issue.
Before 1660 impeachments had in fact been brought in England without
without even the allegation of “high crimes and misdemeanors” in the articles of
impeachment, on charges of being a “monopolist” and a “patentee.” See Case of
Giles Mompesson, 2 State Trials 1119 (Howell 1620); Case of Francis Michell,
id. at 1131 (Howell 1621). There were also charges of “misdemeanors.” See case of
Samuel Harsnet, id. at 1253 (Howell 1624) (ecclesiastical malfeasances). And
there were charges of “Misdemeanors, Misprisions, Offences, Crimes.” Case of the
Duke of Buckingham, id. at 1267, 1308, 1310 (Howell 1626) (procuring officesfor
himself “to the great discouragement of others” and letting the navy deteriorate
under his command); Case of the Earl of Bristol, id. at 1267, 1281 (Howell 1626)
(“Crimes, Offences, and Contempts”). Some impeachments were brought on
charges that were not defined. See Simpson, note 88 above, at 115.
After 1660, when the words “high crimes and misdemeanors” commonly
were added to articles of impeachment, the underlying charges were frequently not
“high.” See note 82 above.
90
Article XVII of the Pennsylvania Charter of 1683 granted the Assembly the
power to impeach criminals. 2 Benjamin Poore, The Federal and State
Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Organic Laws of the United States 1529
(2d ed. 1878) [hereafter cited as Poore]. In 1684 Nicholas Moore, the first Chief
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than in England the standard for impeachment.91 There are
definitions of impeachable offenses in the pre-1787 constitutions of
nine of the 13 original states and Vermont. None makes any
mention of “high crimes and misdemeanors,” and all contain one of
the following formulations: “misbehaviour,” 92 “maladministration,”93
“maladministration or other means by which the safety of the State
shall be endangered,”94 “mal and corrupt conduct in … office,”95 or
“misconduct and maladministration in … office.”96
Despite the breadth of these provisions, impeachment retained
the character of a criminal proceeding.97 The terms describing
impeachable offenses in 18th century state constitutions
(“misconduct in office,” “misbehaviour,” “maladministration”) may
not all sound like crimes to modern ears, but they are in fact terms
for various types of misdemeanors treated as criminal offenses.
Justice of the Provincial Court, was impeached under this provision. See W. Loyd,
The Early Courts of Pennsylvania 61 (1910).
91
As in England, no tribunal or commentator in America before 1787 ever used
the words “high crimes and misdemeanors” as a comprehensive statement of
impeachable offenses.
92
New Jersey Constitution article. XII (1776), reprinted in 2 Poore at 1312.
93
Pennsylvania Constitution section 22 (1776), reprinted in 2 Poore at 1545;
Vermont Constitution chapter II, section 20 (1777), 2 Poore 1863.
94
Virginia Constitution (1776), reprinted in 2 Poore at 1912. See Delaware
Constitution, article XXIII (1776), I Poore at 276-77; North Carolina
Constitution, article XXIII (1776), 2 Poore at 1413.
95
New York Constitution article XXXIII (1777), reprinted in 2 Poore at 1337;
South Carolina Constitution article XXIII (1778), 2 Poore 1624.
96
Massachusetts Constitution. Chapter 1, section 2, article Vlll (1780), reprinted
in 1 Poore at 963, New Hampshire Constitution (1784), 2 Poore 1286.
97
The character of impeachment as a strictly criminal proceeding may have been
weakened in some early American practice, but not decisively. Article XVII of the
Pennsylvania Charter of 1683 granted the Assembly the power to impeach
“criminals.” 2 Poore 1529. That power may have come to seem insufficient
because the Charter of 1696 included the power to “impeach criminals or such
persons as they shall think fit to be there impeached.” Id. at 1535. In the interim,
in 1684, the Assembly had impeached Nicholas Moore, the first Chief Justice of
the Provincial Court. The articles of impeachment, although formidable in
appearance, contained allegations hardly more serious than arbitrariness and
arrogance. See W. Loyd, The Early Courts of Pennsylvania 61 &n.1 (1910).
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Indeed, in the impeachment of Judge Hopkinson of Pennsylvania in
1780 the President of the Council viewed the conclusion that
“crimes only are causes of removal” as following directly from the
premise that judges hold office “during good behaviour.”98
To sum up the situation in 1787, high crimes and
misdemeanors at common law were a precisely bounded class of
crimes against the state or sovereign, and did not include many
serious crimes of violence or crimes against property. Impeachable
offenses in England and America covered a broader range of
misconduct, generally criminal. The words “high crimes and
misdemeanors” did appear in the official papers of impeachment in
England after 1660, but as an incantatory phrase, not an element of
substance. Even the words, as far as I can tell, never surfaced in
Colonial American impeachments.99
Relation of Impeachable Offenses and Judges’ “Good Behaviour”
There is further confirmation, both textual and prudential, of
the true meaning of Article II, section 4, in the provision of Article
III, section 1, concerning the tenure of judges.
Judges hold office “during good behaviour.” These three words
serve both to give judges life tenure and to indicate a standard for
their removal. Article II, section 4, for its part, applies to all civil
officers. There is no indication anywhere in the Constitution that
judges can be removed in any way other than impeachment.100 If
“treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors” in Article
II, section 4, describe the entire range of impeachable offenses, then
judges’ “good behaviour” includes all conduct short of “high crimes
98

Pennsylvania State Trials 3, 56 (1780). The standard for impeachment in the
Pennsylvania constitution of the time was “maladministration.” See p.30 above.
99
Critics of my interpretation of impeachment have argued that the Colonial
American antecedents of impeachment are more important than the English ones.
But nowhere were “high crimes and misdemeanors” the baseline of impeachable
offenses.
100
Deliberations at the Federal Convention indicate that judges are removable
only by impeachment. On August 27, 1787, the Convention rejected a motion to
make the judges removable “by the Executive on the application <by> the Senate
and House of Representatives.” 2 Farrand at 428-29.
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and misdemeanors.” There is, however, no such connection between
judges’ lapses from “good behaviour” and the commission of “high
crimes and misdemeanors.” “Good behaviour” is a term of art that
means, simply, to commit no crime. “Misbehaviour” (and its close
relative “misdemeanor”) was a generic term at common law for
criminal misconduct.101 A federal judge can be removed, therefore,
for committing a crime and only for committing a crime. At the
Convention of 1787, however, “high crimes and misdemeanors”
were not once held out as the test of impeachment and removal of
judges. This silence is echoed in the Federalist, where Hamilton
wrote that impeachment is the only way to remove judges for
“malconduct.”102 Given this, if “high crimes and misdemeanors”103
are also the sole standard of impeachment, then the tenure of judges
takes on a very peculiar tilt. Among other problems, a judge who had
committed murder could not be removed from the bench.104
The difficulty of reconciling judges’ tenure during “good
behaviour” with the offenses enumerated in Article II, section 4,
melts away once the latter provision is understood as requiring the
removal of officers who have committed “high crimes and
misdemeanors” but not excluding their impeachment and removal
for “misbehaviour.”105

101

In the impeachment of Judge Hopkinson of Pennsylvania in 1780 the
President and Council, before whom the case was tried, asserted as though selfevident: “[Judges] hold office during good behaviour. . . . Crimes only are causes of
removal.” Pennsylvania State Trials 3, 56 (1780).
102
The Federalist No. 79, at 474 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
103
These are crimes against the state, remember.
104
A federal judge can be indicted, to be sure, but indictment and conviction in a
court of law do not remove a judge from office. A judge convicted of murder,
imprisoned, and later released could therefore return to the bench.
105
The conventional understanding of Article II, section 4, by contrast, implies
that there are two separate tracks of impeachment, one for the “President, Vice
President, and all civil officers of the United States” who commit “high crimes and
misdemeanors” and another for federal judges who depart from “good behaviour.”
The proponents of the conventional view do not always appreciate this implication
fully, but it inheres in their view.
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Congressional practice in impeachments over the years has been
fully consistent with this understanding. Impeachment of judges has
not been predicated on their having committed “high crimes and
misdemeanors.”106
Similarly, Article II, section 1, of the Constitution (concerning
a President’s incapacity) makes dubious sense coupled with the
conventional understanding of Article II, section 4. Article II,
section 1, provides that in the case of the President’s “inability” the
office shall devolve upon the Vice President. But nothing there
indicates that there is any mode of removal other than impeachment
proceedings. The apparent possibility of removal of a President in
the event of “inability” cuts against the view of Article II, section 4,
as a comprehensive statement of grounds for impeachment.107
The Understanding of Impeachment in the Period 1787-1803
There was considerable debate on impeachment at the
Constitutional Convention of 1787. A number of the delegates also
had much to say on the question in the period immediately following
106

See the discussion of the Pickering impeachment on pp. 43-45 below. Also, the
articles of impeachment against Judge George W. English in 1926 contained no
allegation of “high crimes and misdemeanors.” 67 Cong. Rec. 6283 (1926). The
House went on to vote overwhelmingly for articles of impeachment against
English containing no allegations of “high crimes and misdemeanors. Id. at 628387. Four of five articles of impeachment against Judge Harold Louderback did not
mention “high crimes and misdemeanors.” Proceedings of the United States
Senate in the Trial of Impeachment of Harold Louderback 825-31 (Gov’t
Printing Off. 1933). In 1936 Judge Halsted Ritter was impeached by the House
“for misbehavior and for high crimes and misdemeanors,” and convicted by the
Senate on a general charge of misbehavior. Proceedings of the United States
Senate in the Trial of Impeachment of Halsted L. Ritter 5, 637 (Gov’t Printing
Off. 1936).
107
In the First Congress Representative. Smith of South Carolina pointed out that
the Constitution “contemplates infirmity in the Chief Magistrate; makes him
removable by impeachment; and provides the Vice President to exercise the office,
upon such a contingency taking place.” 1 Annals of Congress 528 (1789) (running
head: “Gales & Seaton’s History of Debates in Congress”). Smith was doubtless
referring to Article II, section 1; his understanding of the clause is impossible
unless he believed that the scope of impeachment went beyond the terms of
Article II, section 4.
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the Convention and in the First Congress of 1789. Made in the
forensic heat of various moments, their utterances do not invariably
cohere perfectly.108 In all, however, they add considerable weight to
the exegesis of the impeachment provisions that I have expounded
here.
Among the delegates to the Convention were proponents of
broad and narrow impeachment powers. At an early session (June 2,
1787) the Convention adopted the resolution of Hugh Williamson
that the executive be “removable on impeachment & conviction of
malpractice or neglect of duty.”109 This clause, which evolved into
Article II, section 4, contains a standard of impeachable offenses.
That may be why some commentators see the same in Article II,
section 4, today. But in the course of the Convention Williamson’s
clause became something different.
At a later session (July 20, 1787) the Convention, after
protracted debate, adopted Williamson’s clause for the draft which
was sent to the Committee of Detail. In the course of the debate on
July 20, James Madison opposed Gouverneur Morris, who found
Williamson’s terms too broad:
Mr. Govr. Morris admits corruption & some few other offences
to be such as ought to be impeachable; but thought the cases
ought to be enumerated & defined:
Mr. <Madison>—thought it indispensable that some provision
should be made for defending the Community agst the
incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the chief Magistrate. The
limitation of the period of his service was not a sufficient
security. He might lose his capacity after his appointment.110

108

Utterances made in the First Congress, though, may be entitled to particular
weight because 1) the framing of the Constitution was still freshly in mind and 2)
unlike the records of the Constitutional and Ratifying Conventions (which are for
the most part shorthand notes transcribed years later) the Annals of Congress are
verbatim transcripts of statements knowingly made in a public forum.
109
1 Farrand at 78-79, 88.
110
2 Farrand at 65.
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Neither incapacity nor negligence are “high crimes and
misdemeanors.” Later in the debate, Morris changed his mind, and
moved closer to Madison’s view:
Mr. Govr. Morris’s opinion had been changed by the arguments
used in the discussion … . Corrupting his electors, and
incapacity were other causes of impeachment.111
The clause actually adopted on July 20 (by a vote of 8 to 2) provided
that the executive was “removeable on impeachment and conviction
for malpractice and neglect of duty.”112 If we are to view the current
form of Article II, section 4, as containing the whole of the
impeachment power, then the apparent consensus of July 20 simply
melted away without a trace.
In the hands of the Committee of Detail, Williamson’s clause
changed from one in which the President is “removable” for
“malpractice and neglect of duty” to one in which he “shall be
removed” for “Treason (or) Bribery or Corruption.”113 This clause
was further modified by the Committee of Eleven. The Senate was
made the trier of impeachments, and the only named offenses were
treason and bribery:
He shall be removed from his Office on impeachment by the
House of Representatives, and conviction by the Senate, for
Treason, or bribery … .114
It takes considerable massaging of this clause as it emerged from the
two committees to read it as describing the full range of impeachable
111

Id. at 68-69.
2 Farrand 64, 69. Madison’s notes summarize the question put to a vote as
“Shall the Executive be removeable on impeachments?” Id. at 69.
113
The changes are reflected in the notes of a member of the Committee:
He shall be (dismissed) removed from his Office on Impeachment by the House
of Representatives, and Conviction in the Supreme (National) Court, of
Treason (or) Bribery or Corruption.
Id. at 172. Farrand indicates that the parts in parentheses are crossed out in the
original. Id. at 163 n.l7. The writing appears to be largely in the hand of James
Wilson. Id.
114
Id. At 481, 497, 499.
112
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offenses. To that end the members of the two committees need only
have replaced “malpractice and neglect of duty” by “treason or
bribery” in the original Williamson clause. To have also replaced “to
be removable” by “shall be removed” suggests an additional purpose.
And, although an inadvertent change is conceivable,115 it would have
been an extraordinary coincidence for the members of the two
committees to have adopted unwittingly the language of mandatory
removal and listed far graver offenses than before without perceiving
the changed meaning of the clause before them. To have limited
impeachment to treason and bribery would be contrary to the earlier
understanding of Madison and Morris on July 20, and would leave
an incompetent or insane President beyond the reach of Congress, as
well as one who had committed murder, highway robbery, or
embezzlement. Rather than put this near-nonsensical construction
on the clause that emerged from the Committee of Eleven, it seems
obvious to take it to mean what it says: if, on impeachment, the chief
executive is found guilty of treason or bribery, he must be removed
from office.
The clause from the Committee of Eleven was debated in the
Convention on September 8. Before coming to a vote, it elicited the
following exchange between George Mason and James Madison:
The clause referring to the Senate, the trial of impeachments
agst. the President, for Treason & Bribery, was taken up.
Col. Mason. Why is the provision restrained to Treason &
bribery only? Treason as defined in the Constitution will not
reach many great and dangerous offences. Hastings is not guilty
of Treason. Attempts to subvert the Constitution may not be
Treason as above defined—As bills of attainder which have
saved the British Constitution are forbidden, it is the more
necessary to extend: the power of impeachments. He movd. to
add after “bribery” “or maladministration.” Mr. Gerry seconded
him—
115

This change was not made in the heat of the moment. Six weeks had elapsed
between the referral to the Committee of Detail and the return of the draft to the
whole Convention.
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Mr. Madison So vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure
during pleasure of the Senate …
Col. Mason withdrew “maladministration” & substitutes “other
high crimes & misdemeanors” <agst. the State.>
On the question thus altered [passed 8 to 3].116

Mason perhaps understood the provision before the Convention as
describing the full range of impeachable offenses,117 although his
remark by no means forces that conclusion.118 Nothing in Madison’s
answer to Mason, however, suggests an understanding that departs
from the precise terms of Article II, section 4.119 The point that so
“vague” a term as “maladministration” would be “equivalent to tenure
at the pleasure of the Senate” applies with perfectly good sense to a
clause governing mandatory removal. If the House brought an
impeachment on any offense, the Senate could rationalize a
capricious removal by characterizing the offense as
maladministration and asserting a duty to remove the President. The
words subsequently proposed by Mason, “high crimes and
misdemeanors against the State,” leave the Senate less room for such
maneuvers. A term can be too vague for inclusion in a list of offenses
for which removal by Senate is required, while remaining a valid
basis for Congress as a whole to exercise discretion. It was Madison,
remember, who held out “incapacity” and “negligence” as
“indispensable” grounds of impeachment in the debate of July 20.120
Unless Madison had a complete change of view in the interim, he
116

Id. At 550. The conventional understanding of Article II, section 4, is derived
in large part from Mason’s remark.
117
If so, he was mistaken. Mason—who was militant on the question of
impeachment, but had been a member neither of the Committee of Detail nor the
Committee of Eleven—may have been expecting the former Williamson clause
concerning the offenses for which a President was “removable.”
118
Mason’s remark make good sense applied to a provision for mandatory
removal.
119
Madison, unlike Mason, had been on the Committee of Eleven, and was more
than likely to have firmly in mind the meaning of the clause before the
Convention.
120
See p.34 above.
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was objecting to “maladministration” as a cause of mandatory
removal, not impeachment in general.121
There is further evidence in Madison’s choice of words on
September 8 that his concern was excessive action by the Senate
under a mandate to remove the President rather than the scope of
impeachment in general. Madison remarked that
“maladministration” in this clause would be equivalent to tenure at
the pleasure of the Senate. The Senate by itself has the removal
power only. The impeachment power belongs to the House of
Representatives. In subsequent remarks on September 8, where his
focus was on the scope of impeachment by the House, Madison
asserted that the House could impeach for “any act which might be
called a misdemesnor,” a standard far from congruent with “high
crimes and misdemeanors against the State.”122
What may account for some of the apparently ill-fitting pieces
in Madison’s notes on the debate of September 8 is the uneasy
coexistence in Madison’s own mind between his view of
impeachment generally (he was for it) and of the role of the Senate
in impeachments (he was against it). Madison was opposed to
making the Senate the trier of impeachments in the first place (he
preferred the Supreme Court, on the ground of its likely greater
impartiality).123 Madison brought this view to the Convention of
1787 from his work in drafting the Virginia Constitution, and
remained in all matters concerning impeachment, both federal and
in Virginia, particularly concerned with defining the Senate’s sphere
of action and, preferably, constraining it.124 Almost certainly
Madison had pressed his view, unsuccessfully, in the Committees of
121

Note Madison’s embrace of “maladministration” as a standard of impeachment
in the First Congress. See p.40 below.
122
Id. At 551. A similar point was made two months later by James Wilson at the
ratifying convention of Pennsylvania: “[T]he Senate stands controlled. . . . With
regard to impeachments, the senate can try none but such as will be brought before
them by the house of representatives.” McMaster and Stone, Pennsylvania and the
Federal Constitution 313-338, quoted in 3 Farrand 161-162.
123
See Peter Hoffer and N. Hull, Impeachment in America, 1635-1805 70-75
(1984).
124
Id.
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Detail and Eleven.125 Consider again the way Madison introduces
the debate on the provision that became Article II, section 4, in his
notes of September 8: “The clause referring to the Senate, the trial of
impeachments agst. the President, for Treason & Bribery, was taken
up.”126 This is a somewhat peculiar way to describe the clause
reported from the Committee of Eleven, which does not focus on
the Senate as directly as Madison’s lead-in would suggest. One
might indeed surmise that this was a sore spot with Madison, who
evidently had the Senate on the brain that day, perhaps because his
views on the Senate’s role had not prevailed in the Committee of
Eleven.
In this light the Mason-Madison exchange of September 8 does
not imply that the Convention rejected “maladministration” as a
standard for impeachment. Rather, the Convention accepted “high
crimes and misdemeanors against the State” as a standard for
mandatory removal by the Senate, after Madison questioned
“maladministration” for such a purpose.
A number of later assertions by Madison himself confirm that
he neither saw in “high crimes and misdemeanors” the full range of
impeachable offenses nor rejected “maladministration” as a ground
for impeachment. Speaking before the Virginia ratifying convention
Madison suggested that “if the President be connected in any
suspicious manner, with any person, and there be grounds to believe
he will shelter them, the House of Representatives can impeach him;
they can remove him if found guilty.”127 He later indicated that the
President was impeachable for “abuse of power.”128 On May 19,
125

Id.
2 Farrand 550.
127
3 Elliot at 498.
128
Id. at 516. Among impeachable offenses held out by others at state ratifying
conventions were conduct exciting suspicion, see 2 Elliott at 45; “malconduct” and
abuse of power, see id. at 168-69; making bad treaties (James Wilson), see id. at
477, 4 id. at 125; an attempt by the President to push a treaty through the Senate
without a quorum being present (John Rutledge), see id. at 268; behaving amiss,
or betraying a public trust (Charles Pinckney), id. at 281; “any misdemeanor in
office” by the President and giving false information to the Senate (James Iredell),
see at 109,127; abuse of trust “in any manner” by the President (Richard Spaight),
126
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1789, in the debates of the First Congress on the Executive
Departments (in which were intermingled numerous comments on
the scope of impeachment), Madison distinguished “high crimes and
misdemeanors against the United States” from impeachable offenses
in general:
I think it absolutely necessary that the President should have the
power of removing from office; it will make him in a peculiar
manner, responsible for their conduct, and subject him to
impeachment himself, if he suffers them to perpetrate with
impunity high crimes or misdemeanors against the United
States, or neglects to superintend their conduct, so as to check
their excesses.129
Later in the same debate, on June 16, Madison asserted that the
President “is impeachable for any crime or misdemeanor before the
Senate, at all times.”130 Madison’s most revealing remarks came on
June 17 when he suggested that the House could “at any time”
impeach and the Senate convict an “unworthy man.”131 Madison
further contended that “the wanton removal of meritorious officers”
was an act of “maladministration” which would subject a President
“to impeachment and removal.”132
Other standards proposed for impeachment in the First
Congress included “misdemeanors,”133 “malconduct,”134
“misbehavior,135 “displacing a worthy and able man,”136 indolence,137
see id. at 114, 276; “any maladministration in his office” by the President, see id. at
47, 3 id. at 17; and misbehavior (Governor Randolph of Virginia), see id. at 201.
Opinions closer to the conventional view of impeachment were expressed as well
in the state ratifying conventions. See 4 Elliot at 48-49; id. at 113.
129
1 Annals of Congress 387.
130
Id. at 480.
131
Id. at 517.
132
Id.
133
1 Annals of Congress at 484, 493.
134
Id. at 495.
135
Id. at 493.
136
Id. at 504.
137
Id. at 489.
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“neglect,”138 and infirmity.139 None of this misconduct was
specifically identified as “high crimes and misdemeanors.”
In the Federalist Hamilton gives no systematic analysis of the
impeachment provisions of the Constitution, but does comment on
several of the provisions in his traversal of Articles I, II, and III.
Hamilton mentions “high crimes and misdemeanors” only once,140
and not as a baseline of impeachable offenses. Rather, it is in a
summary of Article II, section 4, which would be hard to manage
without mentioning high crimes and misdemeanors. In the essay
devoted to impeachment (No. 65), where he takes English
impeachments as the “model from which the idea of this institution
has been borrowed,” Hamilton makes no reference to high crimes
and misdemeanors.141 Hamilton comes closer to stating the scope of
impeachment in his essay on Article III (No. 79), where he is
concerned with the tenure of judges:
The precautions for their responsibility are comprised in the
article respecting impeachments. They are liable to be
impeached for malconduct by the House of Representatives and
tried by the Senate; and, if convicted, may be removed from
office and disqualified from holding any other. This is the only
provision on the point which is consistent with the necessary
independence of the judicial character … .142
In this passage Hamilton evidently means by the “article respecting
impeachments” Article I, sections 2 and 3. The possibilities of
impeachment, trial, removal, and disqualification are dealt with
there. The standard of impeachment that Hamilton asserts is
“malconduct,” for which judges “may” (not “shall”) be removed from
office. Thus, unlike today’s commentators, Hamilton does not treat
Article II, section 4, as the main operative provision on

138

Id. at 594.
Id. at 528.
140
The Federalist No. 69, at 416 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
141
See The Federalist No. 65, at 396-401, 397 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
142
The Federalist No. 79, at 474 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
139
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impeachment, but seems rather to understand impeachment along
the lines I have proposed here.
Although there was considerable reference to impeachment in
the early public discourse surrounding the Constitution, there was
no systematic exegesis of the impeachment provisions exactly
contemporaneous with its drafting and adoption. The earliest
concerted analysis of impeachment in the public record came in the
first impeachment under the Federal Constitution, that of former
Senator William Blount in 1799. Blount, who had been heavily
involved in a shady political intrigue, had already been expelled from
the Senate. His subsequent impeachment was the occasion for
serious forensic excursions into the scope of impeachment. At the
beginning of the trial the Managers for the House, James Bayard
and Robert Harper, expounded very nearly the entire theory of
impeachment that I have proposed here. Specifically, according to
Bayard and Harper, the impeachment power is granted to Congress
in its established sense and, except as expressly modified, with its
common law antecedents; impeachable offenses are not defined in
the Constitution; and Article II, section 4, does no more than
specify offenses for which removal of civil officers is mandatory upon
conviction.143 Blount’s defense answered with what has become the
conventional view of impeachment.144 For those to whom seniority
in time matters, I should point out that the theory of impeachment

143

8 Annals of Congress 2251-53, 2298-99, 2301-04 (1799). There are smaller
strokes as well, including Harper’s insistence on the possibility of lesser penalties
than removal, such as censure. Id. at 2302.
144
Id. at 2263-67. The Blount case went off on the ground that a Senator is not
subject to impeachment for crimes committed in office, see id. at 2318, leaving the
other questions unresolved. There was later some forensic sparring by the same
players in the Pennsylvania impeachment of Judge Shippen in 1805, where
Blount’s former counsel Jared Ingersoll now underscored the common law
antecedents of impeachment in a case where the prosecution sought to dispense
with all requirement of criminality in an impeachment for “misdemeanor.” See
Peter Hoffer and N. Hull, Impeachment in America: 1635-1805 221-226 (1984).

43

Impeachment and Presidential Immunity

that I have proposed here was chronologically the first to be
expounded systematically in a public forum.145
Several key questions on the scope of impeachment arose in the
case of Judge John Pickering in 1803, the first federal impeachment
to result in a conviction.146 The most important element in the
Pickering case is the Senate’s rejection of “high crimes and
misdemeanors” as the standard for impeachment and removal. The
case also bears on the range of possible judgments in impeachment
trials.
Both the debate and action taken in the Senate in the Pickering
case were explicit. Pickering was impeached for drunkenness on the
bench and other misconduct. The defense was that Pickering, being
insane, could not be guilty of a crime, and in particular had not
committed high crimes and misdemeanors. When the trial came
145

This is because Bayard spoke first, a day before any of Blount’s defense counsel.
Some readers may wonder at the significance of this chronology. Apart from any
intrinsic import, it undercuts entirely the erroneous claim by several critics of my
theory of impeachment, among them Judge Bork, that the theory must be
dismissed because it crossed absolutely no one’s mind in the early years. See p.56
below. The opposite is plainly the case.
Both interpretations of the impeachment provisions were also advanced in the
impeachment trial of Justice Samuel Chase in 1805. The defense held out Article
II, section 4, as an exhaustive definition of impeachable offenses. 14 Annals of
Congress 432 (1805). One of the managers of the Chase impeachment
(Representative Rodney of Delaware) held out Article II, section 4, as requiring
removal for the specified offenses, stressing both the common law background of
impeachment and the relation between the possibility of lesser judgments and the
command of Article II, section 4. Id. at 591-607.
The lead counsel for the defense in the Chase impeachment, Luther Martin,
set the stage for a long tradition of constitutional scholarship by quoting Article II,
section 4, erroneously in making his argument: “The words of the Constitution
are, ‘that they shall be liable to impeachment for treason, bribery, or other high crimes
and misdemeanors.’” Id. (emphasis added). Martin’s misstatement of the words
surfaces persistently in modern-day commentary as though it were the actual
language of Article II, section 4. See in note 33 above the inadvertent use of
Martin’s formulation by Cass Sunstein and Vikram Amar.
146
The Pickering case was in fact the only impeachment trial before 1936 in
which there was an actual finding of guilt from which can be drawn inferences
about the range of impeachable offenses.
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down to a vote on Pickering’s guilt, one of Pickering’s defenders,
Senator White proposed the following question for judgment:
Is John Pickering, district judge of the district of New
Hampshire, guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors upon the
charges contained in the _____ article of impeachment, or not
guilty?147
Senator Anderson offered instead:
Is John Pickering, district judge of the district of New
Hampshire, guilty as charged in the ____ article of
impeachment exhibited against him by the House of
Representatives?148
Anderson’s formulation was adopted by the Senate.149 In
opposition, and in defense of his own question, Senator White
argued that, while Pickering had “acted illegally and very
unbecoming a judge,”150 no part of his conduct amounted to high
crimes and misdemeanors, that Senator Anderson’s question did not
establish “directly or indirectly whether those acts amounted to high
crimes and misdemeanors or not,” and that to convict on Anderson’s
question would establish that "it will not hereafter be necessary that a
man should be guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors in order to
render him liable to removal from office by impeachment."151
Senator Dayton argued that “the Constitution gave no power to the
Senate, as the High Court of Impeachments, to pass such a sentence
of removal and disqualification, except upon charges and conviction
of high crimes and misdemeanors" and proposed that after each
determination of guilt there be a further vote "whether those facts
thus proved and found, amounted to a conviction of high crimes and
misdemeanors."152 The Senate proceeded to find Pickering guilty in
147

13 Annals of Congress 364 (1803).
Id.
149
Id.
150
13 Annals of Congress 364 (1803).
151
13 Annals of Congress 365 (1803).
152
13 Annals of Congress 365-66 (1803).
148
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the exact terms of Senator Anderson’s question, by a vote of 19 to
7.153 The explicitness of the preceding debate underscores the import
of the Senate’s action: it found guilt without specifying that Judge
Pickering’s offenses were high crimes and misdemeanors.
Having found Pickering guilty, the Senate passed a judgment of
removal by a separate vote of 20 to 6.154 If no lesser sanction than
removal were possible this second vote would have been unnecessary.
Therefore the second vote both confirms the possibility of lesser
judgments implied by Article I, section 3, and, more importantly,
provides a perspective on the Senate’s understanding of Article II,
section 4. Because Pickering had not been convicted of “high crimes
and misdemeanors,” removal was not mandatory and the Senate had
to take separate action on the question.155

153

Id. at 367.
Id.
155
Readers of an earlier draft of this paper have suggested that the Senate’s
separate vote on removal in the Pickering case can be viewed merely as entry of
judgment and does not imply separate discretionary action on the penalty to be
imposed. Such an understanding of the proceedings in the Pickering case is,
however, hard to sustain. When a verdict is rendered by a jury, judgment is entered
by the court. When sentence is mandatory, there are no separate deliberations by
the body rendering the verdict. In an impeachment trial, the Senators are both
jurors and judges. If in the Pickering case removal had been a necessary
consequence of conviction, the presiding officer should have entered the
conviction and declared that Pickering would be removed from office. The only
possible further vote would be on future disqualification. A separate vote on
removal in such a case would be a serious mistake. Suppose there were a conviction
in an impeachment trial by an exact two-thirds vote of the Senate and then, in a
separate vote on removal called by the presiding officer, removal failed by one vote.
(The vote count for removal in the Pickering case was different, remember, from
the vote for conviction.) Has the Senate then retroactively rescinded the conviction
and acquitted, or what? To suppose that the Senate viewed removal from office as
a necessary consequence of conviction in the Pickering case but went ahead with a
separate vote anyway is to impute to the Senate a gross procedural blunder that
could have caused real mischief. That is not impossible, of course, but nor is it the
way to lay your bet.
154
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Censure and Other Penalties in Impeachments
The implications of the separate vote on removal in the
Pickering impeachment are particularly germane to the late
impeachment involving President Clinton. Because President
Clinton’s misconduct—on any theory of impeachment—was on the
milder end of the scale of gravity, various forms of censure were
proposed from different quarters as a more apposite resolution than
removal from office. The idea of censure, while it had widespread
appeal,156 ran into the entrenched view that removal from office or
acquittal are the only possible outcomes of impeachment
proceedings. Censure was therefore generally proposed as a separate,
alternative, congressional action.
There can of course be congressional “censure” wholly apart
from impeachment. A resolution of both Houses “censuring”
President Clinton would have been, at bottom, an expression of
Congress’s opinion of his conduct.157 Such a rebuke was clearly
within Congress’s power, and might have satisfied a large segment of
the public.158 This form of censure, however, does not have much
bite. Those who wanted to inflict serious pain on the President
would have been left unrequited.159
Censure, as I have suggested above,160 is also a possible outcome
of impeachment proceedings in some cases. The relevant clause of
the Constitution, Article I, section 3, prevents judgments in cases of
impeachment from extending further than removal from office and
disqualification, but not less far in cases where the impeachable
misconduct falls short of “high” crimes. Blackstone expressly
156

The New York Times, for example, editorialized early and often that some
form of congressional censure of President Clinton was the best course.
157
Think of it as a kind of Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in reverse. Instead of “The
President did well,” it would mean “He acted badly.”
158
Note, though, that censure was held out at various points by the President’s
supporters mainly to parry the force of impeachment. After the acquittal in the
Senate, the idea of censure retained little momentum of its own.
159
After the acquittal, it was the Republicans in the Senate who beat back a
Democratic-sponsored censure motion.
160
See pp.17-18.

47

Impeachment and Presidential Immunity

acknowledged among the penalties in impeachments “discretionary
censure, regulated by the nature and aggravations of the offense
committed.”161
What drew many to the idea of censure in the late impeachment
(though few could see their way clear on the mechanics) was that the
offenses charged against President Clinton were not momentous
concerns of state. Indeed the President’s misconduct in my view fell
short of “high” crimes and misdemeanors, if these are understood in
their technical sense at common law. The President was alleged to
have lied before a grand jury where the truthfulness of his prior
deposition in a civil suit was at issue, and to have sought to influence
the testimony of others in related proceedings. Although some
perjury—in a major federal criminal prosecution, for
example—might rise to the level of obstruction of justice (and
therefore a “high” crime within the jurisprudence of impeachment),
the harm to the state here was indirect and, comparatively,
attenuated.162 Similarly, a suggestion of false testimony is generally
less damaging to the machinery of justice (and harder to apprehend
with certainty) than dissuading or preventing the appearance of a
witness altogether.163

161

4 Blackstone *141.
Much was made in the media of a hapless woman convicted of perjury for lying
about sex in a deposition. See, e.g., William Glaberson, Testing of a President:
Legal Issues, New York Times, November 17, 1998, Section A; Page 1; Column
1. But she had denied having sex with the complainant in a sexual harassment suit,
where the sex was the essential element of the claim against her. The lie, therefore,
was centrally related to the claim. Monica Lewinsky brought no claim of any kind
against President Clinton. I defy any reader to show me one person ever convicted
of perjury for having falsely denied an adulterous affair in a divorce proceeding, a
situation much closer to President Clinton’s.
163
For what it is worth, Blackstone does not specifically include perjury among
“high misdemeanors,” but does include dissuading a witness from giving evidence.
4 Blackstone at *126. This does not, however, appear to include suggesting false
testimony. See note 58 above. I should also caution against taking Blackstone’s
catalog of “high misdemeanors” as talismanic. Blackstone classifies high
misdemeanors with a fairly broad brush, and the distinction between them and
other crimes had a different (and lesser) significance in English impeachments.
162
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The possibility of censure has implications beyond allowing an
alternative, milder penalty when the offenses are not “high.” If
censure can be imposed as a penalty upon conviction in those cases,
then an accused could also accept censure as a form of settlement of
impeachment proceedings short of trial.164 Arising in this way (as a
plea bargain, in effect, with a two-thirds vote of the Senate to back it
up), censure would stand as a conviction in impeachment
proceedings and would be far more than a simple unilateral rebuke
from Congress. Among the differences between this type of censure
and a simple congressional resolution is that in impeachment
proceedings Congress is exercising a judicial function. The Senate’s
censure therefore could not be rescinded or cancelled by any
subsequent legislative act of Congress.165
What about fines as lesser penalties than removal from office in
impeachments? In today’s legal environment I think fines should be
viewed as more severe than removal and hence not available in
impeachments. Because the range of penalties in English
impeachments was unlimited, there was little or no occasion for
commentators on English law to consider exact relative degrees of
severity. It seems nearly self-evident that death or imprisonment are
more severe than loss of office.166 Beyond that, the order in which
Blackstone lists penalties in impeachment appears to be somewhat
Commentators on the Clinton impeachment tended to choose vocabulary to
describe his conduct that abetted their spin on the case. Political opponents
intoned, mantra-like, the words “perjury and obstruction of justice.” See Edwin
Meese and Todd Gaziano, Two Impeachment Votes Could Cause Long-Term
Harm, Roll Call, February 4, 1999. Clinton’s supporters used words like “sex” to
describe the President’s conduct. See, e.g., Alan Dershowitz, Sexual McCarthyism:
Clinton, Starr and the Emerging Constitutional Crisis (Basic Books 1998).
164
At one stage of the proceedings, in late 1998, President Clinton’s lawyers
indicated that he would accept a resolution of censure from Congress and pay a
fine in the bargain, as an alternative to impeachment proceedings. The
Republicans in the House, wanting more than half a loaf, brushed the offer aside.
165
Some who questioned the effect of a simple censure resolution pointed out that
Congress could later revoke it, as in fact occurred after the censure of Andrew
Jackson.
166
Also, these are part of the battery of criminal penalties available after removal,
by virtue of Article I, section 3, in regular criminal proceedings.
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random.167 Even if fines could be considered lesser penalties than
forfeiture of office at common law, furthermore, the same relative
severity would not hold today. In 18th-Century England many
public offices had the character of vested property.168 They could be
purchased, sometimes inherited, and constituted a permanent
income stream as well as a social status. The forfeiture of an office of
this sort, given its economic and social consequences, could well be
worse punishment than a fine. Today, when public offices have lost
the character of property,169 fines must be considered more severe
penalties than removal from office or disqualification, or at the very
least so hard to gauge on the scale of severity that the imposition of a
fine in impeachment would be dubious as a matter of due process of
law.170 A conscientious Senate should therefore consider fines
outside the range of penalties in impeachments.171
There are no such doubts about censure. In no plausible scale of
severity is a rebuke, however solemnly framed, more severe than
expulsion from office. And someone who could have been removed
from office or disqualified can hardly be unfairly surprised at being
reprimanded instead.172
And last, although it fits in no particular category of penalty in
impeachments, is the “finding of fact,” a proposal that surfaced in
167

See 4 Blackstone *121, *141. I thought at one time, from the order in which
Blackstone lists these penalties in certain passages (for example 4 Blackstone *141)
that Blackstone might have regarded fines as lesser penalties than forfeiture of
office. On reconsideration it appears that the order in which Blackstone lists
penalties in impeachments has no clear pattern. See 4 Blackstone *121.
168
Note that Blackstone refers to “forfeiture of office” rather than “removal” as a
penalty.
169
I mean here transferable property in the narrow titular sense. In some contexts
today an office can be understood as a property interest, as can reputation.
170
As discussed further below on pp. 54-55, the imposition of a fine would, in this
light, be subject to possible judicial review.
171
Of course if a defendant offered to pay a fine in settlement of an impeachment
(as the President’s counsel proposed as part of a censure arrangement in late 1998)
it would be a different story.
172
Other judgments of the same nature as removal and disqualification that clearly
extend “less far,” besides censure, include enjoining misconduct and temporary
suspension.
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the waning days of the Senate trial. The idea would hardly be worth
mentioning here had it not been, variously, attributed to me or
premised by its proponents on my theory of impeachment. The plan
consisted of a “finding of fact” by the Senate, adopted possibly by a
simple majority before the final vote on conviction or acquittal,
asserting that President Clinton had in fact engaged in various
specified misconduct. After the finding of fact were the further
possibilities of proceeding to judgment or dismissing the proceedings
without final verdict.
The “finding of fact,” plainly, is a simple censure resolution by
the Senate rolled into impeachment proceedings. It would constitute
nothing more than the expression of the opinion of a majority of the
Senators that President Clinton had done some bad things. It has no
intrinsic relation to impeachment at all. It is an obiter dictum by a
subset of judges too small to convict.173 While constitutional, I think,
such an action by the Senate would be inapposite.174 Impeachment is
not the natural habitat of a simple censure resolution.175
Some proponents of a “finding of fact” imagined that it was
derived from my theory of impeachment. It was even called at least
once the “Isenbergh Proposal.” If, however, my contention that
conviction of non-“high” crimes need not entail removal from office
triggered the idea of a finding of fact separate from the vote on guilt,
it did so fortuitously. The finding of fact proposal, precisely because
it had no decisive relation to the main event, was actually consistent
with all the theories of impeachment that were in play at the time.
No action of the Senate, by whatever name, can stand as a conviction
in impeachment short of a 2/3 vote. Since the finding of fact was not
173

While a simple majority can adopt procedures under the Senate rules, any
operative element of a conviction in an impeachment trial must pass by a 2/3 vote.
174
The finding of fact would be something like a tongue-lashing by a judge
expressing disapproval of a defendant’s conduct prior to an acquittal, an action
within the judge’s power but not particularly called for by the judicial function.
175
Showing both parliamentary scruple and a clear understanding of the situation,
Senator Moynihan proposed that the Senate adjourn as a court of impeachment,
convene as a legislative body, censure the President based on findings of fact, then
reconvene as a court to acquit him. This intelligent (though cumbersome) proposal
was ignored by millions.
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a conviction of any kind, it was irrelevant to its meaning or validity
whether high crimes and misdemeanors are the only impeachable
offenses or removal is the sole penalty.
Many of the adherents of the finding of fact plan, sad to say,
and nearly all of its opponents,176 misunderstood the underlying
theory of impeachment from which they imagined it sprang. Some
called the plan the “split vote” approach because they thought that
my view of impeachment implies separate votes on guilt and
removal.177 That is not the point at all. In an impeachment for a high
crime only one vote is possible on the questions of guilt and removal
from office. The only possible separate vote is on disqualification for
future office. Where an impeachment is not for high crimes, as in
the Pickering case, a separate vote on removal (or some other
penalty) is possible after conviction, and that is in fact what
happened there. But even then it would also be possible to combine
the two votes. And in a borderline case, such as the one involving
President Clinton, that might be preferable.178
176

See the discussion on pp. 56-57 below of Judge Bork’s criticism of the finding
of fact and my analysis of impeachment. One critic commenting on the findings of
fact proposal imputed to me a theory of impeachment that not only is nonsensical
on its face, but bears not even a passing resemblance to my actual views on the
subject: “Professor Isenbergh recently amended his earlier proposal [referring to
my student comment in 84 Yale L. J. 1316?] in light of the current political
situation and suggested that the Constitution allowed the House to impeach, and
the Senate to convict, certain kinds of officials for misconduct that did not rise to
the level of impeachable offenses. … According to Professor Isenbergh, only
removal, as opposed to conviction, constitutionally required a two-thirds vote of
the Senate and proof or evidence of impeachable offenses.” Michael Gerhardt,
The Constitutionality of Censure, 33 U. Rich. L. Rev. 33, 36 (1999). This
encapsulation of my writings is so distorted as to strain the limits of good faith
misunderstanding. If it is not a deliberate misstatement, then either Professor
Gerhardt or his research assistants need new reading glasses.
177
See Richard Whittle, Clinton Impeachment Trial, Dallas Morning News,
January 29,1999 (quoting White House spokesman as questioning “split vote”).
178
The proponents of a milder penalty, such as censure, would not want to vote
separately on guilt without assurance that removal would not ensue. They would
therefore urge the adoption of a question combining the determination of guilt
with the imposition of censure. Failure of a 2/3 vote for the proposition would, of
course, mean acquittal. Note that in the Pickering case the Senate debated and
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The Aftermath of Impeachment
After a trial in the Senate what further proceedings involving
the same defendant and subject matter are possible in the courts?
Can a conviction be reviewed by a federal court? Is a person
acquitted or convicted in impeachment subject to further prosecution
at law for the same offenses?
As spelled out further below, the possible scope of judicial
proceedings after impeachment is narrowly framed by Article I,
section 3, and the Due Process Clause.
First, there is no direct review of impeachments on the merits in
the courts. The judicial power exercised by the Senate in
impeachments is separate from the power of the courts under Article
III of the Constitution.179 No federal court stands as a court of
appeals from the Senate. On such basic questions as guilt or
innocence, or the scope of impeachable offenses, the Senate’s
judgment is final.
This does not mean, however, that the courts cannot concern
themselves with impeachments at all. An action of the Senate in
impeachment, if amounting to a fundamental failure of process, can
be attacked in court, as can any grievous denial of due process of law.
The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process of law is a
categorical imperative, good for the benefit of any person against any
action by any part of government.180 The basis for attack on
impeachment proceedings would be informed by the historical
standard of habeas corpus, to wit, that the essential element of an
actual adjudication was lacking or that the action taken by Congress
was beyond the outer limit of its power. This would cover such
aberrant actions as conviction by a simple majority in the Senate, the
agreement of 2/3 of the Senate to abide by the result of a coin toss
voted on different forms of the final verdict. The final vote on guilt was fully
presaged by the earlier votes.
179
Impeachment is mentioned in Article III, section 2, but only to exempt cases of
impeachment from the requirement of trial by jury.
180
“No person shall be … deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.” This imperative does not depend on the existence of any appellate
jurisdiction and, because of it, a denial of due process of law frames a question
“arising under” the Constitution, i.e., a fit subject of judicial consideration.
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by the presiding officer, or the imposition of a prison sentence or
death on a defendant.181 These are, of course, extremely remote
possibilities.182
A more immediately practical question is the possibility of
indictment of a defendant after impeachment proceedings.183 The
question has two branches, according to the outcome of the
impeachment in conviction or acquittal, the latter being of some
lingering theoretical concern for President Clinton. Article I, section
3 provides explicitly that the party convicted in an impeachment
“shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial,
Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.” Therefore an officer
convicted in impeachment can subsequently be prosecuted at law,
although in the President’s case only if removed from office.184
181

The first would be the transformation of an acquittal into a conviction by fiat;
the second the failure to engage in even the simulacrum of an adjudication; and
the third a deprivation of life or liberty by a tribunal not empowered to do so. In
the latter case habeas corpus would be available to the defendant. While the first
two involve no deprivation of life or liberty, and are therefore outside the literal
scope of habeas corpus, both implicate substantial elements of property and
reputation.
182
If any of them ever occurred it would likely mean that the United States had
retained at most the bare forms of republican government, much as Rome in the
1st Century A.D.
183
There was a leak from the Office of Independent Counsel in early 1999 that
Kenneth Starr had concluded that indictment of a sitting President was possible in
light of Clinton v. Jones. See note 23 above. This opened the further possibility of
an indictment of President Clinton at the conclusion of the impeachment
proceedings.
184
Some readers of an earlier draft of this article suggested that my interpretation
of the impeachment provisions, in light of the “indictment” clause of Article I,
section 3, implies that a sitting President is subject to indictment. If a President
can be convicted in impeachment of non-high crimes and not removed from office,
as I argue from other provisions, then doesn’t Article I, section 3, expose him, as a
“party convicted,” to indictment, trial, and punishment while in office? The
answer is: absolutely not. Article I, section 3, simply cuts off the defense of double
jeopardy, leaving conviction in impeachment no bar to further prosecution. It does
not affirmatively expose to indictment or prosecution someone who is otherwise
immune. Therefore if a sitting President is immune from prosecution, conviction
in impeachment does not change that; only removal does. Notwithstanding Article
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As for the effect of an acquittal in impeachment, the apparent
academic consensus (under the influence perhaps of the effect of
conviction in Article I, section 3) is that acquittal also is no bar to
further indictment and prosecution at law. Here I think the
consensus is wrong. An acquittal in impeachment should bar further
prosecution for the same crime to the same extent as an acquittal in
any criminal proceeding. The exception to the protection from
double jeopardy in Article I, section 3, extends only to a “party
convicted” in an impeachment. There is no explicit effect of an
acquittal. It is entirely sensible to afford an accused protection from
double jeopardy after an acquittal in impeachment (but not a
conviction), and possibly necessary as a matter of due process of law.
Someone found guilty upon impeachment for the most serious
crime, such as murder or treason, ought not to be beyond further
account simply by forfeiting office. Also, because of the conviction,
the likelihood of guilt is not yet bounded by any failure to meet a
standard of proof.185 But acquittal in impeachment has no such
corollary. The jeopardy of conviction in impeachment is somewhat
greater than in a court of law. The required vote is 2/3 and the
standard of proof, although far from crystal-clear, is probably lower.
After an acquittal the likelihood of guilt is significantly bounded by
the failure to convict. The acquitted party, having defeated a greater
likelihood of conviction, a fortiori ought not to face the same charges
again.186 President Clinton in my view should therefore face no

I, section 3, a President impeached and convicted but not removed from office
(unlike any other civil officer in this position) still cannot be indicted until out of
office. As a provision to establish the exposure of a sitting President to indictment,
Article I, section 3, would be both awkward and impossibly oblique.
185
It goes without saying, however, that the conventional standard of “beyond
reasonable doubt,” must be met for subsequent conviction at law, regardless of the
standard of proof applied in the impeachment.
186
This conclusion is not based specifically on the double jeopardy clause of the
5th Amendment—literally no “life or limb” is in jeopardy—but on a broader notion
of due process of law. It is now fully established that due process of law implies
protection against double jeopardy extending beyond possible forfeiture of life or
limb and including proceedings across different jurisdictions.
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further proceedings concerning his alleged perjury and witnesstampering, either during the remainder of his term or later.
The possibility of an indictment of President Clinton while in
office, an idea allegedly leaked from the Office of Independent
Counsel in the late days of the Senate trial, should now be
considered foreclosed by the outcome of the impeachment on the
simple ground of double jeopardy. Setting that point aside, Kenneth
Starr apparently concluded from the Supreme Court’s decisions in
United States v. Nixon and Clinton v. Jones that a sitting President is
in fact subject to indictment.187 For this Starr was subjected to an
outpouring of criticism. Although I think his conclusion erroneous
from first principles, as I have inflicted on the reader at some length
above, within the boundaries of his role as a prosecutor Starr’s
conclusion on this point was impeccable. Indicting is a prosecutor’s
job, and there is no reasonable way to read Clinton v. Jones that does
not strongly imply a President’s exposure to indictment while in
office.
Critics
The analysis of impeachment that I have propounded surfaced
briefly in early 1999 during the last days of the trial in the Senate.188
It was attacked, in print and on the airwaves, by the full spectrum of
established constitutional scholars, from icons of originalism to
modernists. Some within this group took apparent umbrage at an
analysis of impeachment from someone outside the constitutional
law fraternity.189 Judge Bork termed the theory “grotesque,” arguing
187

See The President’s Trial: The Independent Counsel Starr is Weighing
Whether to Indict Sitting President, New York Times, January 31, 1999, Late
Edition-Final, Section 1; Page 1; Column 6; National Desk.
188
An earlier draft of this article posted on the University of Chicago Law
School’s Web site was cited with approval by a journalist, see Stuart Taylor,
Conviction Need Not Mean Removal, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 25, 1999, at 15, and by a law
professor. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Convict, but Don’t Remove Clinton, Wall St.
J., Jan. 29, 1999, at A21. My views apparently also influenced the proponents of
“findings of fact” in the Senate. See pp. 50-51 above.
189
Akhil Amar noted pointedly in the Legal Times that “a vast chorus of
distinguished constitutional scholars, right, left, and center” stood against “tax law
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that it created a contradiction between Article II, section 4, and
Article I, section 3, thereby “gratuitously” charging the framers with
sloppy draftsmanship. The opposite is in fact the case. My reading of
Article II, section 4, and Article I, section 3, harmonizes them
perfectly; Judge Bork’s far more loosely.190 It is the conventional
reading of the impeachment provisions, indeed, that opens wide
textual discontinuities, among which are nearly irreconcilable
standards for the removal of judges and other civil officers.
Judge Bork’s broader contention is that “[o]ne is entitled to be
suspicious of a constitutional interpretation that nobody thought of
for over 200 years” and he takes my interpretation to task “for
discovering wholly unexpected meaning in ancient language.” In this
he is simply, flatly, wrong. Not only are there considerable
contemporaneous indications of this understanding of
Professor Joseph Isenbergh” on this issue. If You Convict, You Must Evict, Legal
Times, Feb. 8, 1999, p.19 (italics added). In another missive Amar wrote: “Many
of us have studied the Constitution and its history for years—week in, week out.
Can … Joseph [Isenbergh] (a … tax lawyer) claim the same?” Akhil Amar, Amar
Responds to Taylor, in Guided Missives, in American Lawyer Media (Internet
Publication) posted February 8, 1999. Judge Bork observed in the Wall Street
Journal that “Joseph Isenbergh, a tax expert at the University of Chicago, first
developed” what he calls a “grotesque version of constitutional law.” Robert H.
Bork, Read the Constitution: It’s Removal or Nothing, Wall Street Journal, Feb.
1, 1999, p. 21A (italics added). Since both Professor Amar and Judge Bork seem
to think that the occupation of proponents of constitutional analyses is a relevant
concern to their readers, I want to let them know that when I first worked out this
interpretation of the impeachment provisions I was not a tax specialist, but a law
student. See The Scope of the Power to Impeach, 84 Yale L. J. 1316 (1975)
(student note by Joseph Isenbergh). James Bayard and Robert Harper, meanwhile,
who propounded much the same analysis in 1799, were members of the United
States House of Representatives.
190
It is clear in Judge Bork’s piece that he did not entirely assimilate my analysis of
impeachment. He gives as a “pernicious consequence” of this analysis (or, more
accurately, presequence) that under it Congress might have impeached and
condemned Ronald Reagan by majority vote through a “finding” of “high crimes
and misdemeanors” in connection with the Iran-Contra matter. Congress could,
no doubt, have done that, but no less under Judge Bork’s theory of impeachment
than mine. This is a red herring. Nothing constitutes a conviction in the Senate
short of a 2/3 vote.
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impeachment—so much so that it might well have been the
dominant view from the start—but this interpretation was the first
to be propounded systematically in a public forum, in the
impeachment of William Blount in 1799.191 It was, further,
expounded in the impeachment of Justice Chase in 1805. Most
important, the first federal impeachment to end in an actual
conviction carrying full precedential weight—that of Judge Pickering
in 1803—can be accounted for only under the theory of
impeachment that I propound here. The explicit terms of the debate
in that case leave little doubt of this conclusion.192
My colleague Cass Sunstein has made, far more temperately
than Judge Bork, a similar point. He asks how Article II, section 4,
can mean what I argue, when that meaning was not explained
contemporaneously during the founding and ratification debates.193
Underlying Sunstein’s observation, I believe, is a faulty premise
reflecting a misunderstanding of the import of the historical
materials. That puts it a bit strongly, perhaps, and I might more
properly say that time has misdirected our focus on these materials.
Nowadays we expect our laws to emerge accompanied by concerted
legislative histories in which they are systematically expounded. The
records of founding and ratifying debates are not, however,
legislative histories in this sense. Farrand’s Records of the
Constitutional Convention, for example, are commonly invoked as
though they were a sustained legislative history. They are in fact
shorthand notes, taken largely by Madison, published after
Madison’s death, in 1840. They are not verbatim, and comprehend
only part of the proceedings. The deliberations of the Committees of
Detail and Eleven, from which emerged the bulk of the
Constitution, are black holes. Not one word of the deliberations
there has survived in print. The framers did not produce systematic
191

See pp. 42-43 above.
See pp. 43-45 above.
193
Cass R. Sunstein, Impeaching the President, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 279, 293n
(1998). In conversation Sunstein has asked more pointedly why there was no
explanation when that clause came from the Committee of Eleven to the main
Convention in September 1787? David Currie has made similar observations to
me in conversation.
192
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recapitulations of their work. And it is here, I think, that a dubious
premise has crept into the suggestion that I must establish my
precise reading of the Constitution with contemporary exegesis. No
concerted interpretation of any part of the Constitution can hold up
to the requirement that it be attested by systematic elaboration and
detail provided contemporaneously by the framers. The conventional
view of impeachment holds up rather less well to that requirement
than mine does. It was not systematically expounded until later.
Let us consider the question from the other side. Sunstein’s
view of Article II, section 4, implies that the Committee of Eleven,
with full deliberation, chose not to include among impeachable
offenses the “egregious or large-scale abuses of authority” related to
“the exercise of distinctly presidential powers” that he considers to be
the core of “high crimes and misdemeanors,”194 (which were added to
Article II only later, after a passing sidebar between Mason and
Madison on September 8). Why was there no contemporaneous
explanation of the remarkably narrow scope of the clause reported
from the Committee of Eleven, when the entire Convention had
previously endorsed “malpractice and neglect of duty” as grounds of
presidential impeachment? If you cannot accept an understanding of
a provision that was not fully expounded at the time, then the
reading of the mandatory language of Article II, section 4, as a
definition in the conventional view is unaccountable.
More than likely there was no single understanding of
impeachment among the framers, any more than there was a
perfectly uniform expectation of the scope of presidential immunity.
It is the balance of textual inference and historical evidence that
weighs in favor of my interpretation of both.
Akhil Amar raised several objections in print and on the
Internet. The point on which he is most exercised is that
impeachment, as I understand the constitutional provisions
concerning it, is not limited to “civil officers” (the objects of Article
II, section 4), but may extend to other persons under the
impeachment power granted to Congress without limitation in
194

The provision reported from the Committee of Eleven, remember, mentioned
only treason and bribery.
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Article I, section 3. This Amar finds disqualifying and, in a reductio
of sorts, offers the following catalogue of horrors flowing from my
theory of impeachment, which, as he spins it, implies possible
impeachment of any person for any conduct:
[Y]ou, dear reader, could be impeached—for lying about your
sex life, or for supporting a president who lies about his, or for
jaywalking. Once convicted by the Senate, you could be forever
barred from holding federal office. … By this logic, Congress
would have been free in, say, 1850 to permanently ban all
abolitionists (then a small minority, but growing fast) from
future office holding. In the New Deal, when Democrats held
huge congressional majorities, they could have rendered all
registered Republicans permanently ineligible to hold office.
Thus, we see how revisionism threatens not only separation of
powers, but also basic civil liberties. This is a dangerous thesis.195
It is true that impeachment in England was not limited to public
officials. Therefore, if Article II, section 4, is not a comprehensive
statement of the scope of impeachment (and of course I believe it is
not), federal impeachment is not limited strictly to civil officers and
could in theory, if granted to Congress in its historical scope,196
extend to private persons.
195

Akhil Amar, If You Convict, You Must Evict, Legal Times, February 8, 1999, p.
19. Amar also suggests that in my view of impeachment the House might impeach
the President, and the Senate convict, for vetoing pork-barrel legislation. See id.
Vikram Amar took up this point as well (although he decorously limits it to a veto
of important legislation). See Vikram Amar, The Truth, the Whole Truth, and
Nothing but the Truth about “High Crimes and Misdemeanors” and the
Constitution’s Impeachment Process, 16 Const. Commentary 403, 415n (1999)
(review of Ann Coulter’s High Crimes and Misdemeanors: The Case Against Bill
Clinton). Another red herring. The same could happen within the Amars’ (or
anyone’s) view of impeachment, of course. If Congress has a brain spike, goes
berserk, and disregards the fundamental nature of impeachment as a criminal
process, anything is possible. The view of some of my critics that impeachable
offenses need not be crimes is actually more accommodating to this farfetched
possibility than my theory.
196
The range of penalties possible in English impeachments is, of course, sharply
curtailed in Article I, section 3.
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Amar’s fears of impeachment and disqualification of private
persons by Congress for mendacity, political allegiance, or
jaywalking are nonetheless wildly overwrought.197 This specter is
wholly impossible within any remotely correct understanding of
impeachment. Amar here willfully misses the central element of
impeachment. Impeachment is a common law criminal process, with
a body of precedent. It is, as Blackstone put it, the “prosecution of
the already known and established law.” There is a historical body of
impeachable offenses, which do not include jaywalking or anything
like it. Amar’s concerns about overreaching apply to any common
law criminal process, but less with impeachment than most others.
The habiliments of impeachment, procedural, historical,
precedential—as well as the political accountability of the
congressional players—fully obviate his fears in this regard,
particularly since the worst Congress can do to a private person is to
disqualify for future office. With these limitations, impeachment
simply is not a practical, or even conceivable, weapon against private
persons, except in the most extraordinary or exotic circumstances.198
197

If such a thing ever happened the United States would already have molted into
a theocracy or a fascist state. At that point impeachment would be the least of our
problems.
198
Suppose a demagogue with a violent political philosophy developed a strong
following in a state and controlled the local political machinery. Suppose further
that he had committed a serious crime that could not be prosecuted because of his
local influence. This is more than a purely abstract possibility. Some readers may
recall the career of Leander Perez, an ultra-segregationist political boss in
Plaquemines Parish Louisiana in the 1950s and 60s, who wielded enormous power
locally. Although engaged in massive corruption, and suspected of other crimes as
well, Perez was beyond the reach of any court where trial would be by jury. I am
not holding out, please note, impeachment and disqualification from future federal
office as the most recommendable way to deal with a Leander Perez (although
some high-minded people might approve it), but it would hardly have threatened
the foundation of our system of ordered liberty. Nor—and this is more important
to the question at hand—would 18th-Century lawmakers have thought so. James
Bayard, a manager in the 1799 impeachment of William Blount, offered an
analogous scenario:
Let us suppose, that a citizen not in office, but possessed of extensive influence,
arising from popular arts, from wealth or connexions, actuated by strong
ambition, and aspiring to the first place in the Government, should conspire
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By 1787 this strand of impeachment had fallen into disuse in
England. It has similarly receded from view in the United States.
But not totally. Impeachment of private persons is not
absolutely alien to American practice. The first federal
impeachment, in 1799, was directed at a former U.S. Senator who
had already been expelled from the Senate and was therefore a
private citizen at the time. The Senate dismissed the
impeachment.199 Its action, admittedly, could betoken the view that
only a current civil officer is susceptible to trial in the Senate. Also
possible, though, is that the Senate simply decided it would not try
one of its own whom it had already punished for misconduct. The
Belknap impeachment of 1876 reinforces the latter view. Belknap, a
Secretary of War, had resigned his office on the day of his
impeachment by the House. The Senate decided nonetheless to take
jurisdiction and try Belknap, who was eventually acquitted.200
Belknap was, to be sure, a former civil officer, but Article II, section
4, is couched solely in terms of removal of current civil officers. If
that clause is a comprehensive statement of the scope of
impeachment—and removal from office an inherent element of any
conviction—the Senate’s action in the Belknap impeachment is
impossible.
Like Sunstein, Amar asks why the framers did not explicitly
expound this aspect of impeachment. The reason, here also, is much
with the disaffected of our own country, or with foreign intriguers, by illegal
artifice, corruption, or force, to place himself in the Presidential Chair … what
punishment would be more likely to quell a sprirt of that description, than
absolute and perpetual disqualification for any office … ?
8 Annals of Congress 2254 (1799).
The 1787 impeachment of Warren Hastings in Parliament, of which the
framers apparently approved, had a similar flavor. Hastings had resigned as
Governor-General of the East India Company, but was impeached and tried at
the urging of Edmund Burke among others for corrupt and oppressive conduct in
India beyond the reach of local law. See Peter Hoffer and N. Hull, Impeachment in
America, 1635-1805 113-114 (1984).
199
See 8 Annals of Congress 2247-2416 (1799).
200
See Proceedings of the Senate Sitting for the Trial of William W. Belknap
(Government Printing Office, 1876).

Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper

62

the same. The framers had no particular reason to be concerned with
the impeachment of private persons, if it even crossed their minds,
because impeachment of that sort was not, and will never be, the
main event. In interpreting the constitutional provisions on
impeachment I do not (and do not believe that one can) impute to
the framers a specific collective “intent” on impeachment with all the
cogs and gears operating in their mind’s eyes, any more than I
impute to them an exact day-to-day notion of how the commerce
power would work.
There is, furthermore, an unsettling corollary of the
conventional view that only civil officers as enumerated in Article II,
section 4, are subject to impeachment. If that is the whole story,
then military officers cannot be impeached at all, for any crime. That
would seem a far more dangerous possibility than Congress’s
persecution of jaywalkers, and most certainly “structurally unsound,”
to borrow a phrase with which Amar has flayed my theory of
impeachment.201 Apparently, however, we should fret Congress’s
possible disqualification of jaywalkers from future office, but not its
powerlessness to act at all against a general who is corrupt,
homicidal, or even treasonous.202

201

Akhil Amar, If You Convict, You Must Evict, Legal Times, February 8, 1999, p.
19. In his summary of Article II, section 4 in the same piece Amar elides this
question. Amar writes: “Article II does limit Article I, by saying who may be
impeached (only officers) and for what (only high crimes).” Actually, it is not so.
More precisely Article II says “civil officers,” not “officers.” Therefore the
limitation on the impeachment power in Article II, section 4, in Amar’s view, puts
military officers beyond impeachment.
202
Anticipating the response that Congress can always impeach a President who
fails to discipline a wayward general, let me question whether it is “structurally
sound” to have to cut off the head of the government when one of the arms goes
astray? Some may remember the case of Lieutenant Calley who, after being
convicted of direct participation in the My Lai Massacre, was more nearly
rewarded than punished by the Nixon administration. Suppose the administration
had done nothing at all, or had even promoted Calley? Would impeachment and
removal or censure have been more “outrageous” (another of Amar’s epithets)
than Congress’s forced passivity? There is additional discussion of impeachment of
military officers on pp. 18-19 above.
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The Sense of It

The overall scheme of impeachment in the Constitution, based
on its language and history, is surprisingly clear considering the
variety and confusion of scholarly opinion on the subject.
Impeachment lies for a broad range of serious crimes and, when the
crime aims at the state, removal from office is mandatory upon
conviction. When the crime aims elsewhere, removal is also possible,
but not mandatory, and other penalties, such as censure or
suspension from office, are available. The requirement of removal
upon conviction of “high” crimes against the state reflects the
paramount concern of the sovereignty to protect itself. The
sovereignty in question—the United States—was brand new in
1787, and still fragile. It is easy to see why the framers took no
chances with crimes harming the nation.
Because the range of impeachable crimes is broad, impeachment
is entirely sufficient to protect the public against wrongdoing by the
President. Direct action by the courts against the President is
overkill. There is no need for it, ever.203 Indeed the impeachment
provisions make considerably less sense if the President is susceptible
to compulsory judicial process in addition to impeachment.
It is, therefore, a fair conclusion that subjecting a sitting
President to compulsory judicial process is wrong as a matter of
constitutional principle. What the recent imbroglio demonstrates as
well is that it is a terrible idea in practice wholly apart from that. The
public has no vital interest in having the President subject to
compulsory judicial process, and nothing to fear from presidential
immunity. In order to carry out an illegal or criminal scheme, a
President must near-inevitably act through others whom the courts

203

In the conventional view, by contrast, impeachment does not easily reach such
crimes as murder and arson. Since the conventional wisdom also has the President
immune from indictment—albeit not from other types of judicial action—it leaves
the public defenseless, literally, against a President who kills a private person with
malice aforethought.
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can reach.204 Should, against all odds, the President decide to rob a
7-Eleven acting strictly alone, impeachment would be more than
sufficient pending removal and further prosecution, psychiatric
treatment, or both. As for a private lawsuit brought by a plaintiff
with an axe to grind,205 there is no hazard to the Republic if the suit
is deferred until the President is out of office.
To appreciate fully the incoherence of the prevailing doctrines
on these matters, consider that under current law as widely
understood the President can be sued in tort, but not indicted, or
even impeached in some variants, for murder.206
204

This is the point made by Gouverneur Morris at the Constitutional
Convention, who thought originally that even the impeachment power was
unnecessary. See p.7 above.
205
Or an ex to grind if it’s that kind of lawsuit.
206
Cass Sunstein concludes, correctly I believe, that murder of a private person is
not a high crime. See Cass R. Sunstein, Impeaching the President, 147 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 279, 293 (1998). Sunstein’s analysis of high crimes and misdemeanors is the
most coherent and historically accurate of those embracing the conventional
reading of Article II, section 4. Other scholars’ handling of the question of murder
and other grievous crimes as impeachable offenses is downright tortured. Consider
the following statement of Laurence Tribe:
There may well be room to argue that the very continuation in office of a
president who has committed a crime as heinous as murder, and who under
widely accepted practice is deemed immune to criminal prosecution and
incarceration as long as he holds that office, would itself so gravely injure the
nation and its government that such a president’s decision not to resign under
the circumstances amounts to a culpable commission and thus an abuse of
power and that, in any event, the fact that such a president’s continuation in
office was itself gravely injurious to the nation would transform his remaining
in office, if not the murder he committed, into an impeachable offense.
Background and History of Impeachment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. at 227 (1998)
(prepared statement of Professor Tribe). If the possibility of being shielded by
presidential immunity from indictment makes a serious crime “high,” then we are
back to a nearly open-ended notion of impeachable offenses where “high” means
“serious” in the eye of the beholder. Ask any of President Clinton’s opponents and
they will tell you that his misconduct met that test in a breeze. For further
thoughtful observations on this point, see Jonathan Turley, Congress As Grand
Jury: The Role of the House of Representatives in the Impeachment of an
American President, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 735, 745 (1999).
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Immunity from judicial process does not place the President
above the law. The existence and breadth of impeachment, as the
participants in the Constitutional Convention understood perfectly,
assure that the President is not above the law. What is at issue is
who delivers the law to which the President is subject. In the original
score, if we follow the tempo markings and phrasing faithfully, it is
the Congress, through impeachment, and not the courts, that
imposes the law on the President’s person.
In fact, through all the public pieties about the President’s not
being above the law, President Clinton was rather more below the
law in the Lewinsky affair. No one other than the President of the
United States would have suffered such consequences for having told
a lie in a deposition, on a matter barely relevant to the subject matter
of a case that was in any event dismissed. A lawsuit against the
President, however, brings out the ghouls. A self-appointed
operative made surreptitious recordings of a purported friend and fed
them to the plaintiff’s camp in the suit. Imagine any other tort suit
with so much machinery mobilized to nail a defendant, and going so
far outside the subject matter of the suit. By itself this demonstrates
beyond peradventure why the President ought not to be subject to
routine judicial process in a civil suit.
Another consequence of the President’s exposure to the judicial
machinery in the Paula Jones case—and here the millennial
absurdity of the whole affair is fully revealed—was that it ended up
supporting a minimally sufficient impeachment. Perjury and
witness-tampering are serious crimes, and hence potentially
impeachable, even though the perjury alleged here would be a close
call in a prosecution in a regular criminal court.207 Because
impeachable crimes, however, are not congruent with crimes
prosecutable in regular courts—they reflect the largely self-contained
jurisprudence of impeachment itself—impeachment could not be
ruled out here at the threshold.
207

In his grand jury testimony, President Clinton did not explicitly reassert his
earlier deposition testimony from the Paula Jones lawsuit, but purportedly
proffered a “false and misleading” characterization of the earlier testimony. That
cuts it pretty fine.
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And since we had a full-blown impeachment, albeit with a bare
minimum legal basis, the reader may indeed wonder what difference
it makes whether the President is subject to impeachment only or to
judicial proceedings as well as impeachment. What difference does it
make, in other words, whether the investigatory stage in cases of
presidential misconduct unfolds in the courts or solely through the
arm of Congress? But the Lewinsky affair in fact underscores the
enormous difference between the two regimes. The impeachment
leg of the proceedings was itself wholly contingent on prior judicial
proceedings against the President. Without the initial action against
the President in the Paula Jones lawsuit, there would have been
nothing to which an impeachment could possibly have attached.
The wrongdoing here, and the ensuing impeachment, was
simply an outgrowth of exposing a President to compulsory judicial
process, which the very existence and scope of impeachment render
unnecessary in the first place.
What is perverse about the impeachment of President Clinton
is the idiotic premise on which it rested. The President wasn’t forced
to respond to judicial process in the Paula Jones sexual harassment
suit because he committed a crime of paramount public concern.
That case, remember, was dismissed as meritless. Rather, the
President was charged with wrongdoing in impeachment because of
having had to face compulsory legal process in the Jones case. The
misconduct at issue here—following up a false deposition in the
Paula Jones case with falsehood before the grand jury—had no
independent significance. It was itself merely a byproduct of judicial
process directed at the President, essentially of a sting set up in the
courts. What we had here, in short, was an iatrogenic
impeachment.208
208

The reader doubtless knows what that is, but just in case, an “iatrogenic”
disease is a disease itself caused by medical treatment, as when you enter a hospital
for tests and contract a staphylococcus infection that you would not otherwise have
suffered.
Readers of an earlier draft of this paper suggested that I was trying to defend
President Clinton on the ground that he was entrapped. Not at all. President
Clinton was not entrapped. He was, however, set up—enTripped, if you will. My

67

Impeachment and Presidential Immunity

Compare this with the Watergate affair, where President Nixon
was found to have obstructed justice in the investigation of serious
crimes committed while he was in office, those crimes being
independent of the proceedings that Nixon had sought to subvert.
It is illuminating, in fact, to replay Watergate and the recent
misadventure in an imaginary world where the President is not
subject to judicial process.
The Watergate affair comes out much the same. In that event,
impeachment would have been—indeed was—entirely sufficient to
the end of public protection. With or without court orders directed
against President Nixon, there was ample subject matter for
impeachment, ample evidence, and ample opportunity for Congress
to develop that evidence by compulsory process of its own.209
By contrast, in the recent affair, where as far as I can tell
nothing of public consequence occurred,210 impeachment would
point here is not to exonerate President Clinton, but to stress how perversely
mistaken it was to let private litigants loose against a sitting President.
In public comments about the impeachment Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa
quoted the above line about a “sting set up in the courts” to describe the
machinations of the Office of Independent Counsel. Des Moines Register, Feb.
13, 1999. My point here, actually, is quite different: that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Clinton v. Jones exposed President Clinton to being set up by
maneuvers of purely private litigants.
209
Congress can assert its own demands for information in connection with
impeachment proceedings, and act accordingly if the President does not cooperate.
Given that impeachment is inherently a criminal proceeding, the tribunal (the
Senate) can certainly take into account a President’s evasion or refusal to supply
evidence. Indeed, refusal to provide relevant evidence likely constitutes in itself a
valid separate count of impeachment.
The Independent Counsel statute expressly reserves to Congress the full
range of investigatory powers in impeachments: “An independent counsel shall
advise the House of Representatives of any substantial and credible information
which such independent counsel receives, in carrying out the independent
counsel’s responsibilities under this chapter, that may constitute grounds for an
impeachment. Nothing in this chapter or section 49 of this title shall prevent the
Congress or either House thereof from obtaining information in the course of an
impeachment proceeding.” 28 USC §595(c).
210
The Whitewater side of the special counsel’s investigation turned up nothing
solid against the President.
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never have gotten off the ground. Indeed, there would have been no
public event at all, because Paula Jones’ lawsuit, if held off until
Clinton were out of office, would have attracted no attention in
Congress.211
I can therefore say with some confidence that a regime of
presidential immunity, coupled with the impeachment power viewed
in its true light, would have brought a harmonious resolution to both
of these notorious episodes.212
One often hears that impeachments are particularly vulnerable
to the vagaries of political passion. An implied or express corollary is
that judicial proceedings are not. Don’t believe it. A lawsuit starts at
the caprice—or rapacity—of a plaintiff. Once under way it is an
infernal machine that for much of its course is nearly impossible to
stop. Compulsory legal process can be mobilized without any degree
of consensus. That makes it, when directed at the President, a readymade apparatus for political actors and ideologues of all stripes.213
Recall how easily political opponents of President Clinton were able
to hijack the judicial proceedings in which he was involved.
Impeachment, for its part, cannot get started without a
substantial degree of consensus. In this instance, the momentum for
impeachment was supplied by earlier proceedings in court. Because
the congressional actors in an impeachment are answerable to the
public—which in this event had little stomach for impeachment—it
is hard to see how there could have been an impeachment here, had
it not been delivered to Congress ready-made from another place.
211

And since the raison d’être of the Jones lawsuit was to hurt the President
politically, it might well not even have been pursued after Clinton left office.
212
In either of these two imaginary worlds, it goes without saying, a prosecutor
could mobilize judicial process against all persons involved in wrongdoing other
than the President. In Watergate, that would have been more than sufficient as a
predicate of impeachment. Many have forgotten that by the time the Supreme
Court’s order in United States v. Nixon was issued, articles of impeachment had
already been voted by the House Judiciary Committee.
213
In Clinton v. Jones, the Supreme Court suggested that “the availability of
sanctions provides a significant deterrent to litigation directed at the President in
his unofficial capacity for purposes of political gain or harassment.” 520 U.S. 708.
Really? How much will sanctions deter a judgment-proof ideologue?
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When the dust settled, the House of Representatives
found—or, more accurately, had received as a windfall—enough to
impeach. And although the President’s supporters run the gamut
from apoplectic to apocalyptic on the matter, the House’s action is
far from self-evidently wrong. Once the decision on impeachment
was squarely before the House, there was no fully satisfactory
outcome. The Republicans in the House doubtless acted
opportunistically. Opportunity was served up to them, however, by
the Supreme Court, the Independent Counsel statute, and President
Clinton himself. Short of being saintly, the congressional
Republicans were bound to snap at a bone so tempting as perjury by
the President in a federal judicial proceeding. Imagine a prosecutor
or a District Attorney who gets evidence that the mayor of the
city—who is from the opposing political party—has committed a
crime. This D.A. will seek to indict—it is Pavlovian—even if the
public overwhelmingly favors the mayor.214 Nor will, or should, the
D.A. hold back simply because the crime results from a forced
encounter of the mayor with the least dangerous branch.
President Clinton’s supporters apparently still cannot bring
themselves to take the Supreme Court to task for setting the stage of
this tragicomedy. The Court, though, did exactly what critics impute
to the House of Representatives in this matter: resolve a question of
power in favor of having more. One might expect the Supreme
Court to have a clearer notion of the reasonable (and legitimate)
bounds of its power than the House of Representatives. There
should have been no Paula Jones lawsuit.215 But there was, and we
then had—legitimately—an impeachment based on a foot fault.216
214

A current refrain is that the recent proceedings were more intensely “partisan”
than the Watergate proceedings of hallowed memory. This is largely myth. In the
House Judiciary Committee vote on articles of impeachment in 1974, not a single
Democrat voted against impeachment. There were, to be sure, Republican votes
for impeachment in the Committee, but all the Republicans who voted for
impeachment in the Committee were from the moderate/centrist wing of the
party. The division along ideological lines was as sharp then as now.
215
Not while the President was in office, that is.
216
The President, thanks to the courts, was in a minefield at the time of making
it.
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For a conscientious Senator there was no self-evident course in the
trial. The nature of impeachment, while it did not invite conviction,
did not exclude it either. Given the possibilities in play, acquittal
was, I think, the best outcome. Another tolerable course would have
been for proceedings in the Senate to have been resolved short of
trial with some kind of censure of the President, as discussed
above,217 but that idea never surfaced on the Senate’s radar.218
Statutory Immunity for the President
What can be drawn from this fiasco is a lesson for the future:
Don’t set up the President to get entangled in proceedings in court.
Consider the odds. The cost to those players who may have to wait
until the President is out of office to make their move is likely to be
far smaller, on balance, than the cost to the entire country in the
obverse situation where the President gets stupidly enmeshed in legal
proceedings. Particularly weighty in framing these odds is the scope
and flexibility of impeachment as an arm against presidential
misconduct. Various suggestions that have surfaced in the
accommodationist vein—acknowledging, for example, that the
President is beyond direct judicial command in civil but not criminal
actions—have no evident constitutional footing. The Supreme Court
could come up with no grounded line of demarcation, natural or
otherwise, between United States v. Nixon and Clinton v. Jones.219 A
change in this regime, I suspect, must come from Congress or not at
all.
It is hard to miss the palpable irony running through the whole
affair. President Clinton’s supporters included many from the
cheering section for United States v. Nixon in 1974. That the
instrument for delivering the coup de grâce against President Nixon
217

See pp. 46-51.
Except perhaps in the barely recognizable form of the eleventh-hour proposal
of “findings of fact.” See pp. 50-51 above.
219
Note in this regard the Court’s pronouncement in Clinton v. Jones that “if the
federal judiciary may … direct appropriate process to the President himself, it
must follow that the federal courts have power to determine the legality of his
unofficial conduct.” 520 U.S. at 705.
218
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molted into a land mine on which their champion Tripped left a
number of them shell-shocked. Still, the American legal academy is
so judiciocentric that this nightmarish turn of events has not yet
elicited, in print at least, second thoughts about United States v.
Nixon from its early fans.
Pending an epiphany that brings the courts to reconsider the
entire question of presidential immunity, or a regime of statutory
immunity for the President as outlined below, practical advice for
future Presidents is to master the finer points of Rule 37(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.220 Better to pay off litigants with
220
What President Clinton could have done, which would have been both
honorable and legally skillful, is to refuse to answer questions about his recent sex
life and accept the consequences under Rule 37(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides sanctions for failure to answer questions in a
deposition. In a lawsuit ultimately dismissed as meritless on summary judgment,
any sanction under Rule 37(b)(2) could hardly have been substantial. Better yet,
President Clinton could have refused to be deposed at all, again accepting the
consequences under Rule 37(b), thereby refusing to acquiesce in the extension of
judicial power implied by Clinton v. Jones. In an ensuing showdown with the
courts and Congress—not a likelihood in any event—President Clinton, who
could more than plausibly have assumed the mantle of Defender of the Presidency,
would, I think, have had broad public support.
In a further irony, President Clinton did in the end suffer penalties under
Rule 37(b). And these were more severe than those he would have borne had he
refused the deposition from the start. The district judge in the Paula Jones case
eventually cited President Clinton in contempt for the false deposition and
imposed a penalty of $90,000 under Rule 37. This contempt award took into
account the additional expense borne by the plaintiff’s side, in attorney’s fees and
the like, as a consequence of the President’s false testimony. A refusal to answer
irrelevant personal questions, or even to be deposed at all, could only have entailed
by this standard a smaller penalty under Rule 37, because there would have been no
additional costs, but rather lower costs. Given that the suit was dismissed on
summary judgment without regard for the content of the President’s deposition,
the penalty awarded under Rule 37 necessary to compensate the plaintiff, even
resolving every controverted fact against the President, would in fact be, more or
less, zero.
It was also suggested that President Clinton ought simply to have defaulted
in the Paula Jones suit. See Internight, MSNBC, Nov. 10, 1998 (Remark of Alan
Dershowitz). That would be perfectly all right as an ethical matter in my view, but
after a default a defendant automatically loses on the merits and owes the full
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money, if the courts are bent on letting them loose against
Presidents, than to let them stake out a mortgage on the nation.
And although one might hope that the late events would lead
the Supreme Court to reconsider the President’s exposure to judicial
process, that would be an unexpected turn. The Court’s flat assertion
in Clinton v. Jones that the President is “subject to the laws for his
purely private acts”221 leaves scant room for artful distinction. A
President faced with the problem would not want to take a chance,
in any event, given the unfolding of the recent affair.
Therefore, when the passions of the day have cooled, it would
be a capital idea for Congress to confer on the President, by statute,
a substantial measure of personal immunity from judicial process
while in office. At a minimum, the President’s exposure to any and
all civil actions should be eliminated until the end of term. Immunity
from orders to appear or testify in any proceeding would also be
desirable, to my mind, although the trade-off between public
protection and the President’s exercise of power is admittedly
different in that situation.222
The Broader Canvas
Having exhausted technical arguments, let me add in further
support of the essential soundness of the understanding of
impeachment that I have expounded here what might be considered
the practical wisdom of impeachment. By this I mean that the
actions of the players in impeachments have tended to some extent
to drift into line with the true regime of impeachment, even though
ostensibly they operate under a different view. During the Watergate
affair, for example, Article II, section 4, was generally taken as an
amount claimed. In that event suing the President would become a national
pastime for plaintiffs’ lawyers everywhere. Sanctions under Rule 37(b), by contrast,
are more closely tied to the merits of a case. If the case goes off on the pleadings or
summary judgment (making the content of any disputed deposition irrelevant),
sanctions fall out of the picture as well.
221
520 U.S. 696.
222
The exigencies of a legitimate prosecution of some third person, as in
Watergate or Iran-Contra, I must concede, are less subject to politically motivated
maneuver than a lion-hunter’s private lawsuit.
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exhaustive definition of impeachable offenses, but there was little
focus on the historical meaning of “high crimes and misdemeanors”
as terms of art. Rather, “high crimes and misdemeanors” were
viewed as a generic rubric of impeachable offenses, open-ended in
content and not necessarily limited to crimes.223 In effect, the full
historical range of impeachable offenses (and maybe more) was
packed into Article II, section 4. As a result, the imprecise focus of
the players on the meaning of Article II, section 4, was cancelled out,
more or less, by an expansive view of high crimes and misdemeanors.
In connection with the Lewinsky affair, a few academic
commentators rediscovered more precisely the import of “high”
crimes against the state and urged this view in defense of the
President. This academic change of heart had little sway in the
House of Representatives, however, which went ahead and
impeached anyway, operating more or less within the same notion of
impeachable offenses that informed the events of 1974.224 At the
same time, though, the idea of censure as a congressional response to
lesser misconduct—which barely surfaced in 1974—sprang up
repeatedly during the proceedings. And this despite the initial
223

This was the view of Raoul Berger, among others, and informed the
deliberations of the House Judiciary Committee in 1974. A staffer of the House
Judiciary Committee passed through Yale Law School (where I was a student) at
the time. In conversation I referred to impeachment as a “criminal” proceeding.
The staffer responded to me that the use of the word “criminal” in close proximity
to the word “impeachment” was proscribed among the Committee staff, to avoid
the slightest implication that impeachable offenses might be limited to crimes.
224
The new-found rigorist interpretation of high crimes and misdemeanors, for its
part, makes an uneasy fit with the prevailing broad-gauged reading of Article II,
section 4, as a comprehensive definition of impeachable offenses. If one must
accept that “shall be removed” in Article II, section 4, is just an imprecisely worded
way of ushering in a definition of impeachable offenses, then it is unreasonable to
adopt a rigorist, narrowly technical reading of “high crimes and misdemeanors.”
Within this somewhat looser understanding of Article II, section 4, “high crimes
and misdemeanors” are better viewed as a generic rubric for impeachable offenses.
If the numerous pronouncements on impeachable offenses from 1787-1789, some
of which are discussed above, are taken to reflect the framers’ and others’
understanding of “high crimes and misdemeanors,” then the latter are indeed
vastly broader than their meaning in the English Common Law.
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academic consensus that censure is entirely alien to the impeachment
process. These developments betoken considerable straining against
the conventional wisdom on impeachment to arrive at something
more sensible.
In closing, I want to bring attention back to the fundamental
problem in these events. It seems to many that something went
seriously wrong here. Not a few are inclined to blame the Republican
majority in Congress for having mobilized the machinery of
impeachment against wrongdoing in which the public has no
paramount concern.225 The House of Representatives’ hair trigger
stands in apparent contrast with Congress’s more restrained pursuit
of impeachment in the past. But this affair jumped the tracks long
before it reached Congress, and the House’s action is within the
legitimate, though not sagacious, uses of impeachment. The real vice
here was the combination of a civil action and elaborate prosecutorial
machinery directed at the President. When these events are viewed
from a more detached perspective, it will become apparent to others
besides me, I think, that Congress throughout took a more sensible
view of impeachment, on balance, than the Supreme Court took of
the President’s exposure to judicial process.

225

Much contumely was also heaped on Kenneth Starr, who deserved little of it.
Most of what Starr did was either squarely within his statutory mandate or a
normal part of a prosecutor’s work. Professor Ackerman took Starr to task for
sending a report to Congress on Clinton’s conduct without specifying whether or
how it constituted high crimes and misdemeanors. See Bruce Ackerman, What
Ken Starr Neglected to tell Us, New York Times, September 14, 1998. But that
was not Starr’s job in this instance. In relation to the impeachment, Starr was not
even a prosecutor. The House, as many constitutional scholars know, is the
prosecutor in impeachment. Starr was following a statutory instruction to report
possible impeachable offenses to Congress. See note 23 above. This was a case of
“Just the facts, ma’am.” There was no reason for Starr to superimpose his view of
impeachable offenses on those facts. It is for Congress, in its prosecutory and
adjudicative roles, to determine the nature of impeachable offenses.
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Conclusion

The point of this excursion into the original meaning of
impeachment in the Constitution is twofold. First, the impeachment
provisions correctly understood in their textual and historical setting
are more sensible than the view of impeachment embodied in today’s
academic consensus. Second, in light of the scope of impeachment,
the case for the President’s entire immunity from judicial process is
compelling, if not overwhelming. The academic mainstream takes
too narrow a view of impeachment and too expansive a view of the
President’s exposure to judicial power. There is some cancelling out,
but the correct balance is by no means restored. Under the true
regime, the dismal proceedings concerning President Clinton’s
misconduct would not have been. To be sure, there would also have
been no impeachment and no trial in the Senate if the House had set
the bar of impeachment very high, at narrowly defined “high crimes
and misdemeanors.” But restraint on Congress, once impeachment
has momentum, is largely and inevitably hortatory. And on the other
side of the scales, if you set the bar of impeachment that high, what
do you do about the most grievous crimes that are not “high”? More
than likely your doctrine breaks down or veers off into casuistry. This
explains the amoeba-like quality of “high crimes and misdemeanors”
among many holders of the conventional view.
As the sole lever of public action against a sitting President,
impeachment in its true form discriminates perfectly well between
misconduct of paramount public concern and matters less urgent.
The command of Article II, section 4, to remove civil officers guilty
of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors, protects
the sovereignty from vital harm while leaving Congress discretion to
deal with other serious wrongs.
The unfolding of the Lewinsky affair was not, as some have
contended, a pathology of impeachment. The House of
Representatives did not suddenly become an accusatory pit bull after
two centuries of decorous restraint. Rather, a ready-made
impeachment was delivered to the House in the bizarre aftermath of
a marginal civil action against the President.
The conclusion that begs to be drawn here is that something
went badly astray in the relation between the President and the
courts. The correct understanding of impeachment underscores that
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the exposure of the President to compulsory judicial process is
mischievous, and thoroughly redundant for all but civil litigants who
might have to wait (at most 8 years) for their shot at suing the
President.226 That is a small sacrifice to ward off misadventures of
the sort we suffered of late.

226

To preserve claims against the President, statutes of limitations could be tolled
during a President’s tenure of office. To offset the cost of deferral of claims,
successful litigants could be awarded up to 8 years of pre-judgment interest.
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